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The Public-Private Partnerships and  
the Fiscal Soundness of  
Local Governments in Korea 
By HOJUN LEE* 
This paper studies the risks associated with local finance in Korea by 
identifying the financial status of each local government, including  
the financial burdens of PPP projects, and examined governmental 
future burdens related to PPP projects. We reviewed all fiscal burdens 
associated with projects, such as, for BTL (Build-Transfer-Lease) 
types of projects, facility lease and operating expenses, and, for    
the BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate) types of projects, construction 
subsidies that are paid at the construction stage, MRG (Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee) payments and the government’s share of  
payment. Furthermore, we compared the annual expenditures of local 
governments on PPP projects against their annual budgets and 
checked if the 2% ceiling rule could be applied. 
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   I. Introduction 
 
arge-scale development projects are closely tied to the political interests of the 
region in which they occur. A politician who is elected through the elections 
tends to respond very sensitively to these political interests. According to Kim and 
Lee (2012), the chances of the head of a local government successfully to be re-
elected significantly increases as the overall scale of the large-scale public 
investment projects she attracts during her term increases. This shows that there is 
a strong incentive for the heads of local governments to promote large-scale 
projects to increase their re-election chances and to strengthen their political 
positions. 
However, there is a limit when local governments directly lead public 
investment projects which are funded by the central government in Korea. Because 
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the central government, including the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MoSF), 
manages the public investment plans and measures their financial soundness from a 
national perspective, even if the local government wishes to carry out a project, it is 
often not approved by the finance ministry. On the other hand, in order to meet 
continuously increasing welfare demands, budget expenditures in the social welfare 
sector are expected to grow. Thus, the promotion of large-scale development 
projects within the budgets of local governments is limited. 
For these reasons, local governments often seek to carry out large-scale 
development projects through what is termed a PPP (Public-Private Partnership). 
This enables them to carry out projects without major funding from the central 
government and without placing a greater short-term financial burden on local 
governments. Nonetheless, because most PPP projects require large amounts of 
spending over time frames measured in decades, the financial burden of each 
project must be carefully examined from a long-tern perspective before a decision 
is made to proceed. 
In cases where one is more focused on achieving political benefits through short-
term project performance, as opposed to long-term financial risk, there is a 
possibility that politicians, especially the heads of local governments, would 
promote a project excessively and cause serious financial harm. This is especially 
true for certain smaller local governments, as the performances of even small PPP 
projects can damage the financial liquidity of such local governments.  
Therefore, it is crucial to manage PPP projects sustainably given a certain level 
of financial risk, as the best advantages of public-private partnerships, such as the 
effective sharing of project risks, short-term relief of financial burdens, and the 
leveraging of the private sector’s creativity and efficiency throughout the phases of 
designing, constructing, and operating, can achieved be only when financial risks 
are managed well. 
However, thus far the overall management of PPP projects by local governments 
in Korea has not been entirely satisfactory. The central government authority that 
oversees all PPP projects is the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MoSF). 
However, the central government authority that oversees local finances is the 
Ministry of the Interior. Therefore, collective management at the governmental 
level of agendas such as those related to the impacts of PPP projects on local 
finances is challenging. 
This paper focuses on analyzing the level of risks faced by those managing local 
finances by identifying the financial status of each local government, including the 
financial burdens of PPP projects. This requires a close examination of the nature 
of financial burdens related to PPP projects. The governments’ burdens related to 
PPP projects are, in the case of BTL (Build-Transfer-Lease) projects, facility  
leases and operating expenses, while for BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate) projects, 
construction subsidies that are paid at the construction stage2, MRG (Minimum 
 
2In this research, discussion on local governments’ construction subsidy payments will be excluded, as most 
construction subsidies paid by local governments come from the central government. Even for projects run by 
local municipalities, depending on the project types, often the central government supports certain portions from 
MoSF as a construction subsidy, and there is rarely a case where a local government pays such amounts alone. 
Moreover, despite the fact that construction grants are deemed payable by local governments, detailed information 
such as the payment schedule is not provided. For these reasons, this study does not investigate the financial 
burdens of local government as regards construction subsidies.  
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Revenue Guarantee) payments3 and government’s share of the payment constitute 
the main costs for the government. All of the related payment rules are determined 
by the type of contract, also known as the concession agreement. 
The accounting methods used to for an accurate measurement of the financial 
burdens of governments in relation to PPP projects have been debated over the last 
few years. There is some debate over whether or not to include definite government 
payments, such as facility lease payments for BTL projects, as part of the debt. In 
this regard, some argue that along with changing the government accounting 
standard to the Accrual and Double-Entry Bookkeeping Accounting System, 
accounting method used to measure PPP investments also needs to be strengthened. 
In the case of Korea, in 2009 the government accounting system was converted 
from a cash basis system to an accrual basis system, and the double-entry 
bookkeeping accounting system was also adopted. Before the conversion, under the 
cash basis system, the governments’ payments on public projects were recognized 
as expenditures and were not counted as government assets or liabilities. After the 
conversion to the accrual basis, more claimed that PPP facilities should be counted 
as assets in accordance with the concept of contributed acceptance and that the 
payments should be counted as debt as well. 
More importantly, after the adoption of the new government accounting system, 
the symmetry between corporate and governmental accounting systems become 
more evident. With corporate accounting systems, most recognize BTL projects as 
bonds with secured rights to future lease fees from the government in accordance 
with contributed acceptance. Considering the symmetricity in accounting systems, 
the claim that the leases should be recognized as a liability is compelling. 
Taking this into the consideration, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
announced that it would include lease payments to private partners for BTL 
projects as liabilities in starting in 2011, recognizing this situation as the 
acquisition of real assets.4 Moreover, the Local Finance Act was revised in 2014 
and included lease payments related to BTL projects as debt management items. 
The revised Act also counted lease payments for BTL projects as among local 
government’s liabilities, which serves as a key indicator for use when measuring 
local bond issuance amount limits. 
Despite the fact that there exist various opinions regarding how to account for 
BTL lease payments, this study aims to analyze BTL-related lease payments as a 
governmental burden in accordance with the accounting guidance set by central 
and local governments at present. Moreover, this research will attempt to include 
the government’s share of fixed payments related to BTO-type projects as local 
governments’ liabilities. In this way, this study aims to analyze how the fiscal risk 
of each local government can change.  
On the other hand, with regard to government payments that are decided upon 
 
3The government was found to be taking too much demand risk; therefore, the Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
system was gradually abolished. Starting with new projects in 2009, it was completely discontinued. 
4Until the Local Finance Act was revised in 2014, local government liabilities were limited to municipal bond 
borrowings, debt instruments and guaranteed liabilities. Especially the local governments’ PPP projects have high 
possibilities to cause long-term financial burdens by nature. However, as payments derived from PPP investment 
were not counted as the local liabilities, there has been a limit to accurately replicate financial burdens of local 
municipalities. 
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after the completion of the project, it would be difficult to count these as among the 
liabilities directly. However, it would be important continuously to monitor the 
fiscal burdens of local governments that may stem from these payments. Therefore, 
this research will estimate these potential government payments based on the past 
financial records of each type of projects. Such payments will include costs, such 
as the operation costs of BTL-type projects and the MRG payments of BTO-type 
projects. Through these steps, this research aims to investigate the potential fiscal 
burdens of governments, with these then used as reference data while determining 
project decisions regarding future projects. 
Furthermore, this paper aims to measure the annual fiscal burdens of 
governments against the annual governmental budget. Most international 
organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), recommend that 
government spending on public projects remain under 2% of the government’s 
annual expenditure budget. The Ministry of Strategy and Finance also set their 
guidance at 2% and with continuously monitoring, such that annual expenditures 
on public projects are within 2% of the central government’s annual revenue-
expenditure budget. However, such guidance is not yet considered for local 
governments. Therefore, we will compare the annual expenditures of local 
governments on PPP projects against their annual budgets. Thus, the present study 
examines whether the 2% guidance level can be implemented within all local 
governments or whether any local government would have difficulties meeting this 
guidance level.5 
We feel that this paper is significant in that it offers a full-scale analysis of the 
relationship between PPP projects and the financial burdens of local governments, 
which has not been addressed in detail. It will broaden the horizons of fiscal risk 
analysis by investigating the fiscal impact of PPP project investments on local 
governments, especially the debt level.6  Fiscal risk is analyzed with several 
assumptions about the economic environment in the future as well as the conditions 
of the agreements. We think this analysis is meaningful in public economics and 
accounting, area as it deals with the issue of a discounting rate which is used to 
derive the present value of the fiscal burden in the future. How to determine the 
discount rate is related to the characteristics of the individual projects as well as the 
overall economic conditions. 
  
 
5The 2% guidance is recommended to central governments, but we apply the guidance to the local 
government in this paper as a separate guidance for the local governments has not prepared. We need to set up 
guidance for small local government in the future research. 
6This research was limited when used to analyze the liabilities of local governments, and we were not able to 
include an active analysis of the financial earnings and estimates, fiscal power, and demand for fiscal expenditures. 
As local governments financial burdens for the future can be adjusted due to future financial earnings trends and 
fiscal power, though it is important to note that limits apply here. Although all municipalities’ public investments 
and the financial burdens caused by these investments on local governments can be accessed, various factors that 
could impact local finances were not all taken into consideration. Therefore, it is difficult to define potential fiscal 
risks for local governments based on this research. However, it remains highly significant to note that this is the 
first attempt to analyze the risks for local finance derived by the financial burdens from the public investments.  
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II. Relevant Systems and Previous Literature 
 
Since the National Finance Act was revised in 1963, various systems have been 
introduced in an effort to sustain the fiscal soundness of local governments. With 
the moratorium announcement by Seongnam City in Kyeongki province in 2010, 
the central government started to bolster the management of local finances. 
Establishing the Local Government Financial Risk Alert System through the 
adoption of the Fiscal Risk Management System (December, 2010) is one such 
example. An overview of this risk management system, which was legalized during 
the Local Finance Act7 revision carried out in 2011, is shown in Table 1. 
Every year, key fiscal indicators related to local finances are monitored; after 
these assessments, the levels of riskiness are categorized into three groups: 
‘Normal’, ‘Warning’, and ‘Critical’. If any local government is categorized into the 
“Warning” or “Critical” group, it is advised to take actions to improve its local 
finances. The key objective of the system is a properly assessment of fiscal 
riskiness before any organization faces critical stages and to give each local 
government the opportunity to improve the soundness of its local finances. 
When accessing the fiscal riskiness of each local government, it is very 
important to choose the proper financial indicators that show the financial status. It 
is also crucial grade the level of riskiness properly. As of 2014, according to the 
Local Government Finance Risk Alert System Operational Guidelines established 
by the Ministry of Security and Public Administrations (currently the Ministry of 
the Interior) on March 25, 2013, the monitoring guidelines pertaining to indicators 
are very detailed, categorized by the consolidated central government balance 
deficit percentages, the debt-to-budget ratio, the debt service ratio, local tax 
collection status, remaining balances, the public enterprise debt ratio, and other 
factors. The following guideline shows how each case is categorized into either the 
“Warning” or “Critical” group after the monitoring stage.  
 
TABLE 1—OVERVIEW OF  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL RISK ALERT SYSTEM OPERATION STANDARDS 
Monitoring  
 
⇨ 
Integrated 
Diagnostics 
Financial Risk 
Pre-emergency Alert  
⇨ 
In-depth 
Diagnostics 
(Financial 
Risk 
Management 
Committee) 
Risk Management Solutions by  
Level of Riskiness 
· Tax Deficit 
· Capital Balance 
· Local Debts  
· Profligate 
expenditure 
· Tax Deficit 
· Capital Balance 
· Local Debts  
· Profligate expenditures 
○Warning Group 
· Annual Expenditure / Debts Adjustment 
· Self-Endeavor Recommended 
○ Critical Group  
· Assigned as a group with fiscal risk 
· Fiscal Normalization Program is  
Activated 
 
7The Local Finance Act 
Article 55-2 (Designation of Local Governments in Financial Crisis) 
<This Article was Newly Inserted by Act No. 10439, March 8, 2011> 
(1) The Minister of Public Administration and Security may designate a local government deemed in the 
serious level of financial risk on the basis of the results, or other measures of a financial analysis and 
financial examination conducted under Article 55 (1) and (2) 
(2) The Standards and procedures, for instance, used to designate a local government in financial crisis. 
shall be prescribed by Presidential Decree 
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TABLE 2—LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL RISK ALERT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES 
Orders Indicators ‘Warning’  
Category 
‘Critical’  
Category 
Chapter 65 Article 2-1, Item 1 Consolidated central government  
balance deficit percentage 
Over 25% Over 30% 
Chapter 65 Article 2-1, Item 2 Debt-to-Budget Ratio Over 25% Over 40% 
Chapter 65 Article 2-1, Item 3 Debt Service Ratio Over 12% Over 17% 
Chapter 65 Article 2-1, Item 4 Local Tax Collection Status Below 50% Below 0% 
Chapter 65 Article 2-1, Item 5 Remaining Balances Below 20% Below 10% 
Chapter 65 Article 2-1, Item 6 Public Enterprise’s Debt Ratio Over 400% Over 600% 
Source: Ministry of Security and Public Administration, Order 1, 2013. 3. 25. 
 
In order to maintain fiscal soundness in local governments, the Ministry of 
Security and Public Administration suggests a guideline for the issuance of local 
bonds, the “Guidance on Local Bond Issuance Plan.” The financial status of a local 
government has a significant impact on measurements of its local bond issuance 
capability. Therefore, assessments of indicators which represent the state of 
liabilities, such as a government’s payments for PPP project investments, most 
significantly for the BTL types of projects, have been strengthened in recent years.8 
In 2012, the government payments arising from BTL projects were excluded when 
determining the limit of the local bond issuance amount.9 However, in 2013, in 
order to enhance the effectiveness of the local bond system, the regulation was 
revised to count BTL payments which have been confirmed for local municipalities 
to pay private partners.10 Moreover, in 2014, the category of ‘BTL payments’ was 
revised to ‘BTL Lease Payments’ to define these payments as the total amount 
local governments must pay private partners as part of the lease. As a result, among 
all BTL project-related government payments, only leases, which tend to be 
counted as definitive payments, are recognized as liabilities.  
On the other hand, there exist gaps between the accounting systems of central 
governments and local governments with regard to PPP projects, making it very 
difficult to measure the level of the financial burden appropriately. However, the 
financial burdens stemming from PPP investments are gradually shifting to be 
accounted for as liabilities at present. 
The Accounting Guidelines for PPP projects (BTO･BTL), issued by the Ministry 
of Strategy and Finance in 2011, set the full annual lease payment as a liability. It 
recognizes the lease amounts derived from BTL-type projects as a fiscal gain on 
real assets and accounts for these payments in accordance with the acquisition on a 
deferred payment basis. However, for lease payments, the nominal value is 
accounted for as debt and the operational expenses are only counted at the point of 
the payment, as they do not meet the requirements of the liability category.  
Under the Guidelines for Local Governments Fiscal Accounting System, set by 
the Ministry of Security and Public Administration in 2009, BTL-type project 
investments of local governments are counted as finance leases. However, the 2013 
Handbook for Local Finance Analysis (the Ministry of Security and Public 
Administration) revised the accounting guidelines to include only the remaining 
 
8The Ministry of Security and Public Administration (2011). 
9The Ministry of Security and Public Administration (2012).  
10The Ministry of Security and Public Administration (2013). 
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lease payments for BTL-type projects as liabilities and issued a revised the manual 
which includes related analysis indicators. Through this revision, in terms of 
regularity, the gaps between accounting guidelines set by the central government 
and local governments were narrowed. 
Moreover, the revision of the Local Finance Act11 echoed the sentiments of the 
Ministry of Security and Public Administration’s efforts in strengthening the level 
of local fiscal soundness. The scope of manageable liabilities was expanded and the 
fiscal soundness management plan was developed and carried out. The scope of 
manageable liabilities included BTL-type project lease payments, as mentioned 
above, and also included the liabilities of local public companies and sovereign 
funded institutions. 
In addition, the amendment of the Local Finance Act regulates the provision of 
finance information to residents from their perspective while also disclosing as 
much finance information as possible. The amendment requires information such 
as the total debt, contingent debt, investment review project, itemized statements 
on subsidiaries, investigation results from the Board of Audit and Inspection, and 
local subsidy reductions in financial disclosures, as well as a consolidated analysis, 
evaluation and announcement of each local government’s finances by the Minister 
of Security and Public Administration for a better comparison among local 
governments. Moreover, so that residents can easily assess the local finances 
overall, the head of each local autonomous entity will now draft and finalize a 
consolidated publication referred to as the “Integrated Local Finance Statistics,” 
including data regarding the local government, local public corporations, 
investment agencies and the local education agency, which are to be managed 
separately.  
As presented above, the regulations affecting local financial management have 
been evolving to strengthen each local government’s financial soundness. These 
positive changes have included (1) intensifications of financial crisis prediction 
abilities, (2) an extension of the range of local financial management, and (3) an 
expansion of financial information disclosures. At present, continuous management 
efforts are essential to make these improvements effective.  
For example, the financial burden on local governments for PPP projects 
requires management by regulation; however, many local autonomous entities in 
fact have not included any items under the debt management category. Lease fees 
for BTL-type projects, in the middle of the transition period, are not included when 
identifying organizations which may be at financial risk.  
Moreover, financial burdens in various forms, alongside lease payments for 
BTL-type projects, are expected to be imposed upon the government in the future. 
These potential burdens, however, are not being actively managed, as they do not 
fully qualify as debts. Although not managed as forms of debt, the scope of these 
burdens must be understood to be utilized for future financial decision-making 
activities. 
As previously discussed, the local financial management regulations of the 
Republic of Korea have been improving to strengthen the financial soundness of 
 
11The Revision of the Local Finance Act passed at the National Assembly Plenary Meeting, April 2014. 
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local governments. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conclude that the regulations have 
been settled, and there is room for improvement. This section looks at various 
domestic and international case studies in to understand financial management 
methods for local governments’ PPP projects as recommended by different 
organizations. The section also aims to find ways to settle and improve current 
regulations.   
Domestic studies thus far have mostly proposed the necessity of improving the 
accounting standards regarding the government’s share of PPP project lease 
payments. Choi (2007) emphasized the necessity of a budget management method 
to secure financial stability in the provision of public services through PPP projects 
for leases, where the loan is a major premise and does not allow for a continuous 
expansion of the project scope. As a solution, Choi proposed the establishment of 
an annual ceiling for government subsidization (1~2% of the total expenditures) 
and emphasized that restraints such as reviews of local councils are essential    
for local autonomous entity-driven PPP projects that exceed a certain size. 
Subsequently, Choi (2008) focused on the necessity of systematically managing the 
share of PPP projects within the government’s long-term financial plan, specifically 
public and SOC (social overhead capital) investments. In calling for a managerial 
system, Choi posited that local autonomous entities’ direct executions of PPP 
projects, without the central government’s support, could potentially build a blind 
spot for finance regulation. As of 2008, funding for BTL projects was recognized 
as extra-budgetary debts, but not categorized as national debt; it appeared 
necessary to review the inclusion of for-lease PPP projects when establishing 
strategies to manage national contingent debt. 
The Korean Institute for Local Administration (2008) highlighted the limits in 
evaluating the level of the contribution local finance analyses and diagnoses at the 
time was making to the prevention of and restoration after a financial crisis, while 
emphasizing the need for a legal basis to instigate and systematically manage 
financial crisis management regulations. Min (2009), similar to previous studies, 
argued that BTL projects should be included in the debt takeover identified in the 
Local Finance Act. In detail, Min suggested that local debt management be 
strengthened by amending the Ministry of Public Administration and Security’s 
“regulation on establishing an upper limit for the local bond system and 
management of local loans.”  
Choi (2010) looked at the status of the local finance analysis system, finding that 
its function was as a comprehensive examination system and not as a set of 
regulations that intensively analyzes and diagnoses pressure and crisis in local 
finances. Choi noted that improving the budget and accounting system and 
installing a control system are important, while arguing that the local finance 
analysis system must be revised to cover the financial information of local public 
enterprises and the third sector. Regarding the regulation of financial crisis 
management, Choi also posed the need to enact a regulation of the financial crisis 
management of autonomous entities (tentative) rather than amending the existing 
legislation. 
Both Suh (2010) and Jung (2012) suggested the need to recognize all government 
funds for projects of autonomous entities as debts, forecasting the financial burden  
to increase continuously in the future. Specifically, Jung (2012 & 2013) called for 
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factors in not only BTL leases but also BTO allowances for bad debt or losses.  
Jung also argued that debts from PPP projects should be connected from a macro 
perspective and that residents’ rights to know should be met by disclosing detailed 
information regarding BTL and BTO projects in financial reports. 
Additionally, Min (2013) noted the recent accounting management methods of 
the Ministry of Strategy and Finance and changes in perception toward debts by the 
Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs have made it clear that 
BTL project-related rental fees are local debts. However, Min pointed out that there 
is a gap in the financial management between the “Financial Management of PPP 
projects” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2011) and the “Operation Regulation 
for Financial Accounting” (Ministry of Government Administration and Home 
Affairs), which must be unified as the guidelines of the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance. Min also argued that it is necessary publicly to notify residents of 
comprehensive BTL project-related data such as financial statistics. 
Kwak (2013) pointed out the limited possibility of defaults on monetary debt 
caused by contingency debt, as the current total upper limit ceiling of guaranty debt 
(payment guarantee) for local loans is not controlled properly. The current system 
does take into consideration items regarding an organization’s planning and 
execution to strengthen its financial soundness during a financial crisis, but it 
focuses more on functional execution as a “pre-warning system” and is less 
effective as a crisis management tool for local finances at a stage where a financial 
crisis has already broken out. Therefore, a set of management regulations for local 
financial crises is essential as compared to the current pre-warning system for local 
financial crises. Jung et al. (2013) argued that leases from BTL-type PPP projects 
must be clearly reflected as debts and that there should be a stoppage of debt 
trajectories as well as a definite application of standards for future financial burden 
management (2%).  
According to Kim et al. (2007), it was forecasted that the fiscal burden of 
central-government-level PPP projects in Korea would demand approximately 
2.1~2.3% of the annual budget under certain scenarios. Thus, they suggested the 
need for stronger fiscal management of PPP projects. 
Most previous studies highlighted the need to include PPP projects by      
local autonomous entities, especially BTL-type projects, as local debts for 
comprehensive management. Different arguments regarding a comprehensive 
management method included a call for in-depth verification via a procedure by the 
national assembly for projects of a certain size, as well as a call for more proactive 
public notifications of PPP project-related financial statistics and the provision of 
this information to residents. 
These arguments are similar to the standards of financial management of 
developed countries and international organizations. According to the International 
Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), whether a fund is reported in a government’s 
financial statement is determined by whom among the contracted parties control 
and manage the services provided by the PFI/PPP funds. More specifically, the 
International Financial Reporting Interpretation Committee (IFRIC) states this in 
its 12th Service Concession Arrangements on the financial management regulations 
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of PFI/PPP projects.12 
The UK has ensured that the financial standards of its central government are 
identical to the IFRS standards for the private sector since 2009-2010, also doing 
so for local governments since 2010-2011. The UK government financial 
regulations for PPP/PFI projects (HM Treasury, “Tangible Non-Current Assets,” 
Financial Report Manual, 2009-2010) manages PPP/PFI funds as governmental 
assets and related liabilities if they fall under all five of the categories below: 
 
(1) The government controls and regulates the type of service, user and price of 
the infrastructure. 
(2) The government controls a core part of the remaining share such as 
ownership and beneficiary rights of the infrastructure at the end of the 
service contract. 
(3) The operator has built or obtained the establishment from a third party for 
the service contract, or the establishment has been recognized as the 
operator’s asset in the past. 
(4) In unitary payment, portions related to property security are categorized as 
debt, separate from the service costs and interests. 
(5) Service costs and interests are treated as annual expenditures. 
 
In addition, the standards of the UK are similar to the “Financial Management 
Regulations on BTO and BTL Projects” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2011) 
and coincide with the arguments in various Korean studies where BTL facilities are 
treated as assets and the related rental fees as debts. 
On the other hand, EU nations, unlike the UK, do not manage PPP-related 
government funds as government debts. Countries such as France treat PPP 
projects for service sale as annual expenditures in the form of operating leases, and 
do not show changes in their perspective toward government financial management 
regulations for PPP projects for service sales. The Manual on Government Deficit 
and Debt, 4th Edition (March 2012) by Eurostat included no changes to its 
financial regulations, implying that EU nations will follow Eurostat standards for 
their governments’ financial management until the International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards (IPSAS) are separately available. However, organizations 
such as the IMF and the European Central Bank report that the Eurostat standards 
are too generous, and the regulations of the International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards Board (IPSASB) should be adopted. 
Specifically, the IMF states that all information such as costs and contingent 
liabilities for PPP projects should be transparent. The IMF (2007) also holds that 
PPP projects (or similar types) should provide notification of the contracted 
requirements (including government subsidiaries) and its impact on the financial 
earnings and expenses as well as the national debt in the government budget and 
financial statements. The IMF also argues that there is a need to set an upper limit 
depending on the capabilities of the country in question. 
Many, including the UK which introduced the concept of PPP projects, which 
 
12Regarding influence, although a financial management strategy for private investors may be established, it 
must comply within the government’s financial management method. 
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have become globally popular, as well as major international organizations, 
emphasize the importance of managing government funds for PPP projects. Their 
arguments regarding the need to establish an upper limit for government funds 
toward PPP projects is similar to the perspective in earlier Korean studies. 
Considering this, it can be said that Korea should also understand the 
government burden and prepare financial management solutions for PPP projects. 
Specifically, the scale of the financial burden on local autonomous entities and its 
influence on local finance should be grasped, especially targeting entities that have 
not received a thorough analysis of government subsidiaries. The next part of this 
paper looks at the scale of the governmental financial burden from PPP projects of 
local autonomous entities as well as its impact on local finance. Regulatory 
solutions in managing the PPP projects of local autonomous entities are also 
studied. 
 
III. Estimation of the Change in the Debt Burden from  
PPP Projects of Local Autonomous Entities and an Analysis of 
Its Impact on the Soundness of Local Finance 
 
This chapter estimates the remaining balance of rental fees from BTL-type 
projects among PPP projects of local autonomous entities. As previously discussed, 
including rents from BTL PPP projects in debt is consistent with the improvement 
strategy of regulations, considering the accounting management methods of the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, regulation improvement strategies of the 
Minister of Security and Public Administration, the policy of UK Department of 
the Treasury, and the IMF recommendations. Therefore, the remaining balance of 
BTL PPP projects should be included in the debt of the pertaining local 
autonomous entity. Despite the recent regulation changes, this work has not begun, 
posing limits to how each entity’s financial soundness changes depending on the 
rents of their PPP projects.  
In this Part, how each local autonomous entity’s accounting status changes by 
factoring in the estimated rents to the existing debt of the entity. The change in the 
degree of financial risk at each entity is looked at based on the standards of the pre-
warning system for local financial crisis. 
In addition, some BTO-type projects resulted in direct payment of costs from the 
government. Among these cases are projects that included fixed charges for the 
government to pay fixed amounts of funds to private investors on a fiscal basis. In 
cases which a fixed amount is regularly paid is virtually considered a debt. 
Although the current accounting management standards does not specify directly, 
this study attempts to consider the characteristics of the ‘fixed charges’ and reflect 
them on debts to look at the financial soundness of the local autonomous entities.13 
 
13Many variables, aside from the debt status, should be included in the analysis to assess the risk of local 
finance. The degree of risk can be different for local autonomous entities that hold the same size of debt depending 
on the future financial earnings and expenses, budget changes and fiscal capacity of each entity. Due to the limited 
resources, not all of variables possible could be considered for financial risk analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to 
take caution not to be conclusive in judging the future financial risk of the local autonomous entities as estimated 
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A. Estimation of the BTL Project Balances of Local Governments14 
 
As of the end of 2013, 134 local autonomous-entity-managed projects 
(government funded) 15  of 79 low-level local governments 16 , 17  receive local 
payments as facility leases among their government subsidiaries for BTL projects. 
Among these, 96 projects have commenced and 38 projects have not been started.  
The total facility rental fees for the contract projects amounted to 13 trillion, 
213.7 billion KRW (present value) and 663.7 billion KRW (present value) annually, 
among which approximately 451.1 billion KRW (present value) in leases is 
estimated for payment for the year 2013 for 96 projects under contract.  
The status of facility leases by project type is shown in Table A1 in the appendix. 
The table above visualizes the contracted facility leases of each local autonomous 
entity’s PPP projects. In terms of the size of the annual lease by project, a number 
of projects exceed an annual rental fee of over 10 billion KRW, including Pohang-
si (14.2 billion KRW annually) and Pyeongtaek-si (11.3 billion KRW annually). 
BTL-type PPP projects are structured for the private investor to invest funds in 
the construction process for the establishment of social infrastructure, and to earn a 
certain amount of profit from the long-term lease amounts paid by the government 
for operation, collecting the funds (the total PPP investment). The rental fee is set 
by contract, and the government pays the rental fee to the private investor under 
normal circumstances. The facility lease is calculated as shown below: 
 
   
       /
1 1     
Facility lease Total PPP investment Rate of return
rate of return period of rent
 
    
 
TABLE 3—STATUS OF BTL PROJECTS (GOVERNMENT FUNDED) POST CONTRACT 
Category Contract Pre- 
commencement 
Post- 
commencement 
Total 
Culture and tourism   3 25 28 
Welfare   5  5 10 
Information and communications 1   2  3 
Environment 2 27 64 93 
Grand total 3 35 96 134 
 
TABLE 4—STATUS OF BTL PROJECTS’ LEASES (GOVERNMENT FUNDED) POST CONTRACT 
Category Number of projects managed 
by local autonomous entities 
(government funded) 
Number of low-
level local 
governments* 
Total amount of the 
facility lease 
(present value) 
Annual facility 
lease  
(present value) 
 134 79 13,213.7  trillion KRW 
600.6 trillion KRW 
per Annum 
Note: * The projects executed by metropolitan city headquarters are appropriated as separate local autonomous 
entities.  
                                                                                                         
based on the change in the entities’ debts. 
14The Infrainfo DB (Ministry of Strategy and Finance) is utilized for all PPP project-related information for 
this study. Projects only in the stage of post-contract are included. 
15Projects only in the stage of post-contract are included. 
16The headquarters of each local autonomous entity is assumed as a separate low-level local government. 
17Educational facility BTL projects of local autonomous entities were excluded in this study as the leases are 
paid by the Ministry of Education. 
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As shown above, the BTL-type lease follows the equation of the principal and 
interest method by dividing and paying the investment principal and interest, which 
reflects the rate of return on top of the total PPP investment by a PPP project 
operator, into equal amounts annually. Therefore, the annual facility lease to be 
paid is virtually settled when the total amount of PPP investment is decided. The 
BTL-type rental fees are considered to be similar to fixed debts. 
Additionally, considering the fact that a lease set by contract has never been 
deducted due to problems during the operation time,18 it can be presupposed that 
the private investor or the government will pay the set rent, as fixed by contract, 
during the time of the project. Thus, to estimate the size of the BTL lease to be 
placed as a burden on local autonomous entities, it is fair to use the method of 
subtracting the lease payment made by the government through 2013 from the total 
lease laid out in each contract. As the payment is made via the equation of the 
principal and interest method on a fiscal basis, the total lease is divided by the 
rental period to calculate the annual rent, which can then be applied to the 
remaining project period to calculate the size of the future BTL rent. 
This study assumes that the government has made payments as contracted 
through the end of 2013, as each local autonomous entity does not have actual 
information about the lease payments made. As this study focuses on local finance, 
the amount to be paid by each entity is separately calculated and combined by 
categorizing the payer within the government subsidiaries for BTL projects. In 
short, the lease payment data (divided into national treasury and local cost), as 
recorded in the Infrainfo DB, was utilized to calculate the share of local costs paid 
by local autonomous entities for facility leases of projects, which was then applied 
to the annual facility lease to calculate the balance of the lease between the end of 
2013 and the end of the completion of each project. 
By using this method to calculate the lease balance of 134 projects after 2014, 
the local burden on local autonomous entities was estimated to be 4 trillion 773.8 
billion KRW (present value) in total. When the lease balance for current BTL 
projects was categorized according to the local autonomous entities, Jeju Special 
Self-Governing Province recorded the highest level at 340.9 billion KRW (present 
value), followed by Gwangju-si at 264.2 billion KRW and Daejeon-si at 250.3 
billion KRW. Table 5 below and Table A2 in the appendix indicate the total lease 
amounts and the remaining balance of payments after 2014 by each local entity 
more in detail.   
 
18In BTL projects, the government pays the total of the rental and operation costs to the private investor on a 
fiscal basis. Even if the government subsidiary is reduced due to construction problems during operation and paid 
to the SPC instead, it is customary for the SPC to treat this as an operation problem and normally pay the 
contractor, of relatively supreme status, while decreasing the operation cost payment to the operator. Regardless of 
the fairness of this procedure, the lease must be paid as stipulated in the contract. As this study focuses on an 
analysis of the impact PPP projects have on local finances, the structural problem in BTL projects where the 
responsibilities are shifted to the operator, not considering construction problems, is not discussed. 
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TABLE 5—ESTIMATED BALANCE OF BTL FACILITY LEASES (LOCAL FUNDS) BY  
LOCAL AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES 
Competent authority 
(Lower level) 
Sum of total 
lease by 
local 
autonomous 
entity 
Sum of 
remaining 
lease by 
local 
autonomous 
entity as of 
year-end, 
2013 
Competent authority 
(Lower level) 
Sum of total 
lease by 
local 
autonomous 
entity 
Sum of 
remaining 
lease by 
local 
autonomous 
entity as of 
year-end, 
2013 
Seoul 
Metropolit
an City 
Gangnam-gu (2) 990 537 
Jeollabuk-
do (11) 
Iksan-si (4) 3,713 1,417 
Busan 
Metro-
politan 
City (6) 
Haeundae 238 191 Gimje-si (2) 1,815 545 
Buk-gu/Saha-gu 216 122 Gunsan-si 1,433 376 
Headquarters 2,309 1,559 Wanju-gun 910 232 
Daegu Metropolitan City 986 502 2,309 1,559 1,987 811 
Incheon 
Metro-
politan 
City (3) 
Bupyeong-gu 670 519 Jeongeup-si 1,050 221 
Headquarters 1,848 1,246 Jinan-gun 499 119 
Gwangju Metropolitan City (2) 3,911 2,642 
Jeollanam-
do (14) 
Gangjin-gun (2) 1,357 600 
Daejeon Metropolitan City (2) 3,839 2,503 Wando-gun 305 150 
Ulsan Metropolitan City (3) 4,685 2,218 Headquarters 602 281 
Gyeonggi-
do (10) 
Paju-si (3) 3,166 951 Hampyeong-gun 103 49 
Yongin-si (2) 2,610 725 Hwasun-gun 290 145 
Gimpo-si 1,627 488 Mokpo-si (3) 3,047 811 
Anseong-si 1,219 363 Yeosu-si (2) 1,694 464 
Ansan-si (2) 278 206 Naju-si 1,207 344 
Pyeongtaek-si 2,854 907 Damyang-gun 480 91 
Gang 
won-do (4) 
Gangneung-si 1,305 281 Jangheung-gun 681 175 
Wonju-si 2,104 572 
Gyeong 
sang 
buk-do 
(20) 
Gyeongju-si (3) 4,547 1,968 
Chuncheon-si 1,902 570 Andong-si 951 489 
Hongcheon-gun 621 2,841 
158 
880 
Uiseong-gun 207 101 
Sangju-si (2) 2,336 567 
Chung 
Cheong 
buk-do 
(14) 
Jecheon-si (4) 897 216 Pohang-si (3) 6,128 1,838 
Jincheon-gun (2) 682 182 Goryeong-gun 530 99 
Goesan-gun 353 72 Gimcheon-si (2) 1,915 636 
Boeun-gun 402 100 Mungyeong-si 1,749 478 
Okcheon-gun 856 215 Yeongdeok-gun 708 168 
Chung 
Cheong 
nam-do 
(19) 
Eumseong-gun 337 78 Yeongju-si (2) 2,169 651 
Jeungpyeong-gun 1,748 470 Yecheon-gun 820 246 
Chungju-si 518 238 Uljin-gun 1,200 327 
Cheongju-si 1,153 526 Chilgok-gun 1,603 445 
Headquarters 1,117 487 Uiryeong-gun 74 32 
Gyeryong-si (2) 5,106 2,213 Gimhae-si (3) 4,121 1,128 
Cheonan-si (6) 1,132 354 Yangsan-si (2) 1,618 390 
Dangjin-si (2) 2,248 759 Jinju-si (2) 3,091 887 
Asan-si (3) 653 169 Geochang-gun 587 119 
Geumsan-gun 641 152 Changwon-si (2) 2,741 790 
Nonsan-si 641 152 Sacheon-si 227 108 
Boryeong-si 718 212 Tongyeong-si 1,696 494 
Seosan-si 1,366 388 Jeju Special Self-Governing 
Province (10) 9,840 3,409 Seocheon-gun 598 159 Hongseong-gun 1,361  405  
Note: 1) “(  )” Indicates the number of projects. 2) The total facility rental fee is the national treasury and local 
funds combined by contract at the present value. 3) The lease balance is calculated based on the local share within 
the total facility rental fee. 
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B. Change in Debt the Ratio Based on  
the Financial Status and BTL Rental Fee by  
Local Autonomous Entity 
 
The aim here is to sum up the debt and BTL lease balance of each local 
autonomous entity in an effort to understand the impact of the previously 
calculated BTL lease balance on local finances. First, the financial status of each 
local autonomous entity shows a total of 28 trillion 296 billion KRW in total local 
debt as of the end of 2013, with 21 trillion 665.4 billion KRW in metropolitan city 
debt and 6 trillion 923.2 billion KRW in city, country and district debt. Table 6 
shows the sum of local city, country and district debt by each metropolitan city. 
The balance of local loans is the highest in the order of Seoul (approximately 5 
trillion 300 billion KRW), Gyeonggi-do (approximately 4 trillion KRW) and 
Incheon (approximately 3 trillion 300 billion KRW). 
On the other hand, the previously estimated BTL balance is the sum of all rental 
fees (present value) to be paid by local autonomous entities annually after 2014. 
However, to factor this in as debt, present value must be applied in a way similar to 
how debt is calculated. According to National Accounting Standards Article 46 
Clause 1, in cases when the gap between the nominal value and the present value is 
important in transactions of long-term deferred payment terms, present value is 
used to evaluate value. 
On the other hand, which discount rate is applied can have an important  
influence on the result of calculating the remaining BTL rental fees at present value. 
According to National Accounting Standards Article 46 Clause 2, the effective 
 
TABLE 6—BALANCE OF LOCAL LOANS BY ACCOUNTING  
(INCLUSIVE OF CITIES, COUNTRIES AND DISTRICTS) 
Category Sum  General 
accounting 
Other 
special 
accounting  
Public enterprise 
special accounting 
Fund 
Grand total 282,960   109,935   84,182   88,614    229  
Seoul Metropolitan City  52,822    5,130   46,121   1,571   -  
Busan Metropolitan City  27,781   14,079   11,034   2,637   31  
Daegu Metropolitan City  19,597   11,930    5,845   1,822   -  
Incheon Metropolitan City  32,764   12,423   12,333   8,008   -  
Gwangju Metropolitan City   8,026    3,730   -   4,296   -  
Daejeon Metropolitan City   6,990    2,970   -   4,004   16  
Ulsan Metropolitan City   5,295     743   -   4,533   19  
Sejong Special Self-Governing City   1,245       1   -   1,244   -  
Gyeonggi-do  39,572  18,729    1,584  19,233   26  
Gangwon-do  11,226   6,912     464   3,850   -  
Chungcheongbuk-do   6,676   2,301     304   4,071   -  
Chungcheongnam-do   9,989    2,903    3,320   3,753   13  
Jeollabuk-do  10,293   5,521      498   4,274   -  
Jeollanam-do  12,712   5,020    1,074   6,546   72  
Gyeongsangbuk-do  13,388   6,959      711   5,718   -  
Gyeongsangnam-do  17,657   6,795      671   10,141   50  
Jeju Special Self-Governing Province   6,927   3,789      223    2,913   2  
Note: “Local loan status as of end of 2013” (http://lofin.mospa.go.kr) 
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interest rate of the transaction is to be discounted. The effective interest rate can be 
viewed as the rate of profit in BTL projects. However, considering the fact that 
there was no virtual reduction in BTL rental fees, and that the private operators of 
the BTL projects during the operation phase assume the rental fee to be at the same 
level of risk of the national debt, there is a limit when viewing the total PPP 
investment applied as taxation as fair value. Moreover, if the total PPP investment 
cannot easily be viewed at fair value, the effective interest rate cannot be viewed as 
profit. Therefore, this study applied 3.38%, the average yield of Korean Treasury 
bonds (five-year maturity) over the past three years, as a “Korean National 
Treasury distributed profits rate of similar requirements in case the effective 
interest rate is difficult to identify,” as stated in the National Accounting Standards.  
When the remaining balance of BTL leases (present value) is added to the local 
debt amount under these assumptions, the total debt of 41 low-level local 
governments that are planning or operating BTL projects increases by 
approximately 22%, and the debt-to-budget ratio increases by approximately 
3.4%p compared to the exiting ratio. The debt-to-budget ratio for some local 
autonomous entities increased dramatically. Specifically, the debt ratio of local 
entities, including Gyeryong-si of Chungnam (20.48%p), Gangjin-gun of Jeonnam 
(14.32%p), Gyeongju-si of Gyeongbuk (12.31%p), Cheonan of Chungnam 
(12.10%), Jecheon-si of Chungbuk (11.23%p) and Iksan-si of Jeonbuk (10.04%p), 
increased tremendously. 
As shown above, facility leases during BTL projects can pose a major burden on 
local finance, and BTL rental fees must be considered when managing local 
finance in the future. Due to these needs, the “Local Bond Plan Standards” 
(Ministry of Security and Public Administration, 2014) has identified the balances 
of BTL leases to be managed as debt, but they are not included in the monitoring of 
the identification of organizations at risk of financial crisis.19
 
19It can be considered for inclusion during the monitoring of the identification of organizations at risk of a 
financial crisis, as BTL lease balances have a major impact on local finances. With this intention, the Board of 
Audit and Inspection told the Ministry of Security and Public Administration to reflect the BTL lease balance in 
the “Pre-Warning System Operation Regulation for Local Financial Crisis” during its audit in August of 2014. 
However, instead of simply applying the sum of the BTL lease balances to the existing debt while keeping the 
current Pre-Warning System standards (“Caution” if the debt-to-budget ratio is more than 25%; “Serious” if it is 
over 40%), introducing new standards in reflecting BTL lease amounts can be considered through a 
comprehensive review, considering the future status of local finance. 
National Accounting Standards Article 46 
(Evaluation based on the present value of bonds and debts) 
(1) When the difference between nominal value and present value is important in the 
bonds and debts resulting from transactions of long-term deferred payment 
terms, long-term cash loans or other similar transactions are evaluated in terms 
of present value. 
(2) The equivalent value of the total amount of earnings or payment for bonds and 
debts, according to Clause 1, is determined after discounting effective interest 
rate of the transaction. (If the effective interest rate is difficult to identify, apply 
the Korean National Treasury distributed profits rate.) 
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FIGURE 1. CHANGE IN THE DEBT RATIO WHEN  
INCLUDING THE BTL LEASE BALANCE OF LOW-LEVEL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
TABLE 7—REVIEW OF DESIGNATION STANDARDS OF ORGANIZATIONS IN FINANCIAL CRISIS   
Category Local government Debt-to-budget ratio 
(Existing) 
Debt-to-budget ratio 
(Inclusive of  
BTL lease balance) 
Change after 
including BTL 
lease balance 
Busan Headquarters 27.80% 28.92% “Caution” 
Daegu Headquarters 28.10% 28.69% “Caution” 
Incheon Headquarters 36.10% 37.13% “Caution” 
Gyeonggi Yongin-si 29.00% 31.93% “Caution” 
Chungnam Cheonan-si 15.00% 27.10% “Caution” 
Gyeryong-si 11.40% 31.88% “Caution” 
Jeonbuk Iksan-si 17.20% 27.24% “Caution” 
Note: The grades for Busan, Daegu and Incheon Metropolitan City were originally “Caution,” and none had 
changes.  
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C. The Need to Reflect the Debt of Fixed Charges in  
BTO Environmental Projects 
 
Certain BTO environmental projects contracted between the years 2001 and 
2004 have regulated fixed charges, and nine projects were confirmed to be paying 
fixed charges.20 These fixed charges are in fact similar to debts, as they work as an 
agreement for the government to pay fixed amounts to PPP projects every fiscal 
year. Therefore, this study estimated the total fixed charges to be paid by the 
government until the completion of future operations of the projects that are 
currently receiving the fees. The estimation was then reflected in terms of debt.  
To do so, the unchangeable, contract-based fixed charges of the relevant projects 
were utilized to estimate the remaining fixed charges to be paid after 2014 through 
to the conclusion of the projects’ operations. The current fixed charges of 2014 
were calculated based on the actual prices as of 2013 (2010 equivalent to an index 
of 100), and a 3% annual inflation rate was assumed for the charges thereafter until 
completion. The same method was used to calculate the remaining fixed charges of 
BTO environmental projects, and the calculated balance was included as local 
government debt. As a result, Chilgok-gun was degraded to receive the grade of 
“Caution,” while Pohang-si (23.35%) was very close to this grade as well. 
 
TABLE 8—LEASE BALANCE + FIXED CHARGES BALANCE  
(UNIT: 100 MIL. KRW) 
Category Local 
government 
  Debt  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(A) 
Budget 
(Grand total 
including 
fund)  
 
 
 
(B) 
Debt-to-
budget 
ratio  
 
 
 
 
(A/B) 
(%) 
Debt ratio 
including 
lease  
balance  
 
 
 
(A’/B)  
Balance of 
environmental 
fixed charges 
 
 
 
 
(Present 
value) 
Rent 
balance  
+ fixed 
charges 
balance 
debt  
 
(A”) 
Rent 
balance 
+ fixed 
charges 
balance 
debt  
ratio  
(A”/B) 
Busan Headquarters 28,670 103,085 27.80% 28.92% 1,326 31,136 30.20% 
Incheon Headquarters 31,981 88,593 36.10% 37.13% 651 33,542 37.86% 
Gyeonggi Pyeongtaek-si 719 11,956 6.00% 11.50% 693 2,068 17.30% 
Gyeonggi Hwaseong-si 1,715 14,050 12.20% 12.20% 582 582 16.35% 
Jeonbuk Headquarters 7,546 53,235 14.20% 14.20% 2,143 9,689 18.20% 
Jeonnam Bosung-gun 0 3,942 0.00% 0.00% 118 118 3.00% 
Gyeongbuk Pohang-si 1,414 13,678 19.99% 19.99% 459 3,193 23.35% 
Gyeongbuk Chilgok-gun 446 4,614 16.75% 16.75% 459 1,231 26.69% 
Note: 1) Hwaseong-si and Bosung-gun, Jeollabuk-do had no remaining BTL rents. Only remaining fixed charges 
would be generated. 2) 3.38%, the average yield of Korean Treasury bonds (five-year maturity) over the past three 
years, is applied as the discount rate of the present value. 
 
 
20The projects that were to be paid at the beginning of operation were excluded, as the payment period has 
expired.  
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TABLE 9—FIXED CHARGES OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 
Competent authority Name of project Operation  
completion date 
Fixed charges 
 (Unchangeable, 1 mil. KRW/yr) 
Current fixed 
charges in 2014  
(100 mil. KRW /yr) 
Total balance of fixed 
charges  
(100 mil. KRW) 
Gyeonggi-do 
Pyeongtaek-si 
Pyeongtaek-si Sewage Treatment  
Equipment  
(Tongbok, Jangdang, Hyeondeok of 
Anjung) 
June 30, 2026 
Tongbok+Jangdang 
2,561.99 mil. KRW/yr 
Hyeondeok 1,453.24 mil. KRW/yr 
59 873 
Hwaseong-si Hwaseong-si Sewage Treatment Equipment June 30, 2026 3,379 mil. KRW/yr 49 733 
Gyeongsangbuk-do 
Chilgok-gun Waegwan Terminal Sewage Disposal Plant (Stage 1 of extension)  March 31, 2026 2,636.1 mil. KRW/yr 40 575 
Pohang-si Pohang Terminal Sewage Disposal Plant Stage 2 (Extension) October 31, 2022 3,866 mil. KRW/yr 54 542 
Busan Metropolitan City Dongbu Terminal Sewage Disposal Plant October 26, 2021 7,682 mil. KRW/yr 113 983 Yongdo Terminal Sewage Disposal Plant December 31, 2020 4,900 mil. KRW/yr 71 548 
Incheon Metropolitan City Geomdan Terminal Sewage Disposal Equipment February 18, 2028 272.874 mil. KRW/yr 49 844 
Jeollanam-do Bosung-gun Beolgyo and Hoecheon Terminal Sewage Disposal Plants December 1, 2021 
861 mil. KRW/yr 
237 mil. KRW/yr (Ecology park) 16 137 
Jeollabuk-do Building and operation of Jeollabuk-do Basic Environmental Treatment Facility June 24, 2028 10,854 mil. KRW/yr 157 2,795 
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D. Estimation of Further Government Payments and  
  Analysis of Local Financial Burdens Regarding 
Local Governments’ PPP Projects 
 
Government payments for PPP projects are generated in various forms aside 
from lease fees for BTL projects and fixed charges for certain BTO projects. The 
minimum revenue guarantee payment for BTO projects and operation costs for 
BTL projects are some of the typical payment forms. However, these forms were 
not discussed in the preceding section as they do not satisfy the requirements of 
debt in terms of government payment methods. Nonetheless, in order to grasp the 
effect of government payments for PPP investments on the finances of local 
governments, it is necessary continuously to forecast the scale and amount of 
government payments and feed the results of such an analysis into regulations, 
even if some payment forms cannot be categorized as debt. Therefore, this part of 
the study estimates future MRG payment amounts for BTO projects and operation 
costs for BTL projects, which are not considered as debt funds but which can have 
a tremendous impact on the finances of local governments. In doing so, we can 
come to understand the anticipated scale of the burden to be carried by each local 
government for private sector investments in addition to BTL leases and BTO fixed 
charges, as previously discussed.  
First, based on year-end data recorded as of 2013, there are 19 local government 
projects and five Korean cash-reserve subsidized projects that are forecasted to 
need future MRG payments, as explained in detail below:  
 
TABLE 10—PROJECTS SUBJECT TO MRG  
Category Project 
Local government projects The following 19 projects:  
the Busan Sujeongsan Tunnel,  
Daegu Buman Road,  
Gwangju Second Circulation Section 3-1,  
Gwangju Second Circulation Section 4,  
Incheon Munhaksan Tunnel,  
Incheon Manweolsan Tunnel,  
Incheon Wonjeoksan Tunnel,  
Yeoju-si Food Disposal Facility,  
Boryeong River Sewage System,  
Mungyeong Gaeun Sewage Treatment Plant,  
Yangju Sincheon Sewage System,  
Gangwon Misiryeong Road,  
Gyeryong-Si Waste Incineration Facility,  
Icheon-Si Sewage System,  
Gunpo-Si Daeya Sewage System,  
Gyeongju-Si OedongGeoncheon Sewage System,  
Gongheung Doyang Sewage Treatment Plant,  
Pocheon Sludge Fluidized Bed Incineration Facility,  
and the Gongju Yugu Gongam Donghaksa Sewage System 
Korean government- 
subsidized projects 
The following five projects:  
Gwangju Second Circulation Section 1,  
Seoul Umyeonsan Tunnel,  
Seoul Metro Line 9,  
Gyeonggi Ilsan Bridge,  
and Gyeongnam Machang Bridge 
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TABLE 11—ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS 
Category Assumption 
Base year December 31, 2013 
Inflation rate Through 2013: CPI record 
After 2014: Apply annual rate of 3% 
Discount rate Apply annual rate of 3.38% (the average yield of five-year 
Korean Treasury bonds over the past three years) 
Actual operation income Apply a weighted average ratio of actual income from user 
charges to the anticipated income from user fees at the time 
of the contract for the past three years (2011-2013) 
Minimum responsibility 
management standard 
Reflect the future MRG estimation if the minimum 
responsibility management standard exists where MRG is 
not paid in case the achieved actual operation income does 
not exceed a certain proportion of the contracted operation 
income 
Assumed charges If the actual income from user charges is calculated based 
on the assumed charges at a certain ratio to the charges 
decided upon at the time of the contract in assessing the 
MRG amount, apply a weighted average of the ratio 
between the actual traffic and charges at the time of the 
contract to the actual traffic and charges for the past three 
years. This method is used rather than applying the ratio 
between the anticipated income from charges to the actual 
income from charges for the past three years in order to 
apply the traffic factor (Q) and the user charge unit (P) 
separately.  
Note: The weighted average is calculated at the ratio of (2013:2012:2011) = (3:2:1).  
 
Furthermore, the assumptions below were made to estimate the MRG amount to 
be generated for the projects after 2014. The base point was the end of 2013, and a 
3% future annual inflation rate was applied. Moreover, the future income from user 
charges was forecasted based on the actual charges earned during the past three 
years, where the income from 2013 was given more weight than that of 2011; the 
weighted average income from each year was calculated at a ratio of 3:2:1.21 
The forecasted MRG amount based on the above suppositions are shown in the 
table below. The MRG payment to be issued after 2014 for government-subsidized 
local projects is estimated to be approximately 100 billion KRW per year for a total 
of 200 billion KRW. However, local governments are recently easing or abolishing 
the MRG for the projects that are anticipated to generate excessive MRG 
payments, targeting the restructuring of the process to result in both low risk and 
low profit levels. The currently posed burden of the MRG is expected to become 
lighter if these new attempts succeed. 
In addition, similar to the rental fee calculations of BTL projects, the remaining 
balances of the operation costs were estimated per project and then summed by the 
local government. Moreover, based on the above data, the sum total of BTL project 
rental fees, operation costs, estimated MRG amounts for BTO projects, and fixed 
charges are presented in Table A5 in the appendix. 
   
 
21The payment forecast based on the assumptions in this analysis is a simplified means of forecasting which 
differs from the forecasting method of the IMF’s PFRAM (PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Model). 
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TABLE 12— ESTIMATION OF THE MRG AMOUNT TO BE GENERATED IN THE FUTURE  
(UNIT: 100 MIL. KRW) 
Category Name of project Estimated 
MRG 
generation 
after 2014 
 
Estimated MRG 
generation after 
2014 
(Present value) 
Payment 
period for 
remaining 
MRG after 
2014 
Annual average 
of MRG paid 
during the 
remaining 
period  
Local 
government 
projects 
Busan Sujeongsan Tunnel 1,012 758 15 67 
Daegu Buman Road (4) - - - - 
Gwangju Second Circulation Section 3-1 2,297 1,470 21 109 
Gwangju Second Circulation Section 4 - - 20 - 
Incheon Munhaksan Tunnel 667 502 9 74 
Incheon Manweolsan Tunnel (3) - - - - 
Incheon Wonjeoksan Tunnel (3) - - - - 
Yeoju-si Food Disposal Facility 5 3 9 1 
Boryeong River Sewage System 81 60 12 7 
Mungyeong Gaeun Sewage Treatment Plant 52 42 11 5 
Yangju Sincheon Sewage System (1) - - - - 
Gangwon Misiryeong Road 1,033 657 23 45 
Gyeryong-Si Waste Incineration Facility - - 8 - 
Icheon-Si Sewage System - - 6 - 
Gunpo-Si Daeya Sewage System 106 74 16 7 
Gyeongju-Si OedongGeoncheon Sewage 
System - - 5 - 
Gongheung Doyang Sewage Treatment 
Plant 4 3 12 - 
Pocheon Sludge Fluidized Bed 
Incineration Facility - - 8 - 
Gongju Yugu Gongam Donghaksa Sewage 
System (2) - - 12 - 
Sub-total 5,258 3,569 187 315 
Korean 
government-
subsidized 
projects 
Gwangju Second Circulation Section 1 4,940 3,704 15 329 
Seoul Umyeonsan Tunnel 1,425 1,034 21 68 
Seoul Metro Line 9 (3) - - - - 
Gyeonggi Ilsan Bridge 3,535 2,225 25 141 
Gyeongnam Machang Bridge 6,688 4,160 25 268 
Sub-total 16,587 11,123 86 806 
Grand total 21,846 14,692 273 1,121 
Note: 1) Changed into financial projects as Yangju-si took over PPP projects. 2) The MRG amount is calculated by 
simply carrying over the unchangeable estimated income by contract, which only came into effect as of January of 
2006, for 10 months. 3) The MRG is abolished for these projects due to reasons including changes in contracts. 
   
Establishing an upper ceiling for annual government spending for PPP projects is 
one of the solutions proposed to manage the government’s financial risk. This 
solution involves managing the total annual spending on PPP projects, typically 
including rental fees for BTL projects, operation costs, MRG payments for BTO 
projects and fixed charges, by holding it to within 2% of the total annual expenditure 
budget (a 2% ceiling rule).22 This study estimates the annual government 
 
22The 2% ceiling rule, however, is proposed for the central government level, and there has not been a 
suggested rule for the local level. In this paper, we consider each local government as an independent central 
government and apply the 2% ceiling rule. Even if the 2% rule in this paper is restrictive, our approach is not 
excessive because each local government with its own budget takes all responsibility for its PPP contracts with 
private partners. Regarding the relative size of the local government budget, the rule should be tightened. 
Moreover, the rule was initially proposed based upon the case of the U.K., where the fiscal risk is relatively well 
managed and the PPP management history is longer than in any other country. Thus, the rule cannot be applied to 
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FIGURE 2. RATIO BETWEEN ANNUAL EXPENDITURES AND  
BUDGETS BY LOW-LEVEL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
 
expenditure on PPP projects by local governments and attempts to determine the 
ratio with regard to the budget. This methodology allows us to examine whether 
each local government is effectively managing its financial risk in PPP projects 
based on the 2% ceiling rule. To do this, it was necessary to gather the annual 
expenditures of various types of government spending, as previously calculated. 
Due to limited resources, however, annual lease and operation costs were utilized 
as indicated in contracts, and the average amount of annual payments is presented 
for the MRG. Therefore, there is a possibility of a gap compared to the actual 
annual spending. Nonetheless, the analysis used here assumed that the available 
data was sufficient to understand the scale of the financial burden placed on each 
local government due to PPP projects compared to the original budget.  
The results of the analysis conducted here found that the annual spending on PPP 
projects by Gyeryong-si, Chungnam (2.50%) exceeded 2%, while four local 
governments, in this case Gangjin-gun in Jeonnam (1.75%), Chilgok-gun in 
                                                                                                         
any country, and it must be stricter for countries where fiscal risk is not well maintained. Therefore, the 2% rule is 
not the only reference, and local governments should not feel comfortable only because the 2% rule is met in their 
cases. 
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Gyeongbuk (1.64%), and Jecheon-si (1.61%) and Gwangju-si (1.54%) in 
Chungbuk, recorded annual spending amounts which exceeded 1.5%. These local 
governments are thus shown to be burdened with excessive financial 
responsibilities for PPP projects compared to their budgets. The analysis calls for 
some efforts to ease the financial burdens on local governments from various 
perspectives as well as a cautious approach for a better execution of new projects in 
the future.23  
 
E. Conclusion 
 
The scale of the burden on local finance posed by the PPP investment system 
pursued by local governments was estimated and changes in financial risk levels 
were examined. It was a common understanding that local finance does not face a 
high level of risk if rental fees for BTL and fixed charges for BTO, which carry the 
features of debt, are included in local government finances. In contrast, the study 
showed that there are in fact some local governments that have financial risk.  
In addition, the estimated annual payment as various government subsidiaries for 
PPP projects, aside from the payment forms that fall under the debt category, were 
calculated. These results showed that most local autonomous entities, with an 
exception of a few, are managing the expenditure within the aforementioned 2% 
rate of their annual budgets. 
This paper differs from earlier work for the following reasons. First, earlier 
works mainly studied the institutional or policy aspects of PPP projects and did not 
include a quantitative analysis. At best, some of them merely reviewed one or two 
PPP projects of a local government to derive policy implications. This paper 
overcame these limitations and analyzed all of the PPP projects at the local level. 
Secondly, this paper adopts the Accrual and Double-Entry Bookkeeping 
Accounting System and considers the lease payment of local governments as 
government debt. It is unique, in Korea, to sum all lease payments as government 
debt and consider the fiscal risk of each local government, though doing so is 
closer to global standards. Thirdly, this work also represents the first attempt to 
include fixed charges of BTO projects in the analysis. At the earlier stage of 
Korean PPP, fixed charges were introduced to relieve the risk of the private sector. 
However, previous works did not include them when considering the fiscal risks of 
local governments. The characteristics of the charges are very similar to those of 
the lease fee of BTL projects because the payment of fixed charge is confirmed by 
agreements. Thus, we included these charges in our analysis. Fourthly, papers 
related to the fiscal burden from MRG have been published in the literature, but the 
studies were done mainly at the central level. The present paper can be considered 
to be the first attempt to analyze all of the fiscal burdens from MRG at the local 
level and then to provide important policy implications for each local government. 
Finally, the paper is the first to apply the 2% ceiling rule to local governments. 
With this approach, we can easily check and compare the levels of fiscal risk from 
the PPP projects of each local government. 
PPP projects must be carefully examined before their execution, as they may 
 
23See Tables A6 and A7 of the appendix for details. 
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develop long-term financial risks while lessening the financial burdens. Only 
considering the fact that PPP projects do not pose short-term burdens may increase 
the long-term financial risks for local governments, which ultimately can imperil 
the national financial status. A detailed review and analysis of the financial risk 
forecast is required for both national and local government-managed PPP projects. 
Decision making for project execution also requires consideration of the possible 
financial risks that may harm local governments. In doing so, this study presents 
the three suggestions below.  
First, it is necessary to examine potential financial burdens during the early stage 
of PPP project execution, which usually includes the steps of eligibility 
investigation, proposal review, and validation. This will provide an institutional 
tool as a reference to use when determining a project’s validity and eligibility by 
reviewing the financial burdens during the planning process.  
Second, information on the financial risk level, based on the financial status of 
the local government and project in question, must be studied according to the 
process of the PPP project review board. A comprehensive review would not only 
examine the validity of a project but also the potential effects of the project on local 
finances. Furthermore, the fiscal impact of a PPP project on a smaller local 
governments can be higher, which should be considered during the project 
selection process. 
Third, it is necessary to consider the extension of the 2% ceiling rule, which is 
now only applicable to projects managed by central governments, to those 
managed by local governments. Continuous management is essential for holding 
estimated expenditures below the 2% ratio relative to the annual budget, whether it 
is considered as debt or not. Focusing only on debt funds for government 
subsidiaries may result in some financial risk stemming from MRG payments or 
BTL operation costs. Therefore, local governments must closely examine the scale 
of annual government funds for current PPP projects. In addition, it is important to 
examine the possibility of managing the share of annual government funds within  
2% of the annual budget for long-term financial risk management, especially when 
planning new projects.  
A concerted effort to manage the financial risk of PPP projects will ultimately 
increase the sustainability of and stabilize the PPP investment system. Indiscrete 
execution of PPP projects that only consider short-term relief of financial burdens 
and political interests harm the safety of the system and foster negative 
perspectives toward PPP projects in the long run. We expect a stable, long-term 
advancement of the PPP investment system through rigorous management of the 
financial risks of PPP investments based on the suggestions presented here.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
TABLE A1—FACILITY LEASE STATUS BY PROJECT TYPE (PRESENT VALUE) 
(UNIT: 100 MIL. KRW) 
Competent authority (Lower level) Name of project Total 
facility 
lease 
(present 
value) 
Annual 
facility 
lease 
(present 
value) 
Seoul Metropolitan 
City (2) 
Gangnam-gu Gangnam Geriatric Hospital 686  34   
Establishment of Daechi 
Reservoir Themed Sports Park 305  15  
Busan 
Metropolitan City 
(6)  
Haeundae-gu Haeundae New Town Library 238  12  
Buk-gu/Saha-gu 
(Multiple) 
Hwamyeong Library and Dadae 
Library 216  11  
Headquarters Establishment of the 4th Busan City 
Geriatric Hospital 154  8   
Establishment of Busan 
Information Highway  180  23  
Busan Metropolitan City 
(Gamjeonbun-gu) Sewer 
Maintenance 2011 
1,067  53  
Busan Metropolitan City 
(Samrak-gu & Deokcheon-gu) 
Sewer Maintenance 2012 
908  45  
Daegu 
Metropolitan City 
Headquarters Daegu City Art Museum 986  49  
Incheon 
Metropolitan City 
(3) 
Bupyeong-gu Bupyeong Culture & Art Center 
(Bupyeong Art Center) 670  33   
Headquarters Relocation of Incheon City 
Library 339  17  
Incheon Metropolitan City Sewer 
Maintenance 1,509  75   
Gwangju 
Metropolitan City 
(2) 
Headquarters Gwangju Metropolitan City Sewer 
Maintenance 2007 2,272  114  
Gwangju Metropolitan City Sewer 
Maintenance 2008 1,639  82  
Daejeon 
Metropolitan City 
(2) 
Headquarters Daejeon Metropolitan City Sewer 
Maintenance 2006 2,246  112  
Daejeon Metropolitan City Sewer 
Maintenance 2008 1,593  80  
Ulsan Metropolitan 
City (3) 
Headquarters Ulsan Museum 840  42  
Ulsan Metropolitan City Sewer 
Maintenance 2006 1,906  95  
Ulsan Metropolitan City Sewer 
Maintenance 2008 1,940  97  
Gyeonggi-do (10) Paju-si (3) Paju Kyoha Library 204  10  
Paju-si Sewer Maintenance 2011 1,508  75   
Paju-si Sewer Maintenance 1,454   73  
Yongin-si (2) Yongin-si Sewer Maintenance 2009 819  41  
Yongin-si Sewer Maintenance 1,791  90  
Gimpo-si Gimpo-si Sewer Maintenance 1,627  81   
Anseong-si Anseong-si Sewer 1,219  61  
Ansan-si (2) Safe Ansan Secure Ansan U-City 
Establishment Stage 2 98  12  
 Establishment of High-Tech 
Ansan U-City Broadband 
Information Network 
180  18  
Pyeongtaek-si Pyeongtaek Sewer Maintenance 2,854  143  
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TABLE A1—FACILITY LEASE STATUS BY PROJECT TYPE (PRESENT VALUE) (Continued) 
Competent authority (Lower level) Name of project Total 
facility 
lease 
(present 
value) 
Annual 
facility 
lease 
(present 
value) 
Gangwon-do (4)  Gangneung-si Gangneung-si Sewer Maintenance 1,305  65  
Wonju-si Wonju-si Sewer Maintenance 2,104  105  
Chuncheon-si Chuncheon-si Sewer Maintenance 1,902  95  
Hongcheon-gun Hongcheon-gun Sewer 
Maintenance 621  31  
Chungcheongbuk-do 
(14) 
Jecheon-si (4) Excellent Herbal Medicine Retail 
Support Facility  181  9  
Herbal Medicine Life Science 
Center 321  16  
Jecheon-si Sewer Maintenance 
2007 1,391  70  
Jecheon-si Sewer Maintenance 
2009 948  47  
Jincheon-gun (2) Jincheon-gun Sewer Maintenance 
2005 360  18  
Jincheon-gun Sewer Maintenance 
2006 537  27  
Goesan-gun Goesan-gun Sewer Maintenance 682  34  
Boeun-gun Boeun-gun Sewer Maintenance 353  18  
Okcheon-gun Okcheon-gun Sewer Maintenance 402  20  
Eumseong-gun Eumseong-gun Sewer Maintenance 856  43  
Jeungpyeong-gun Jeungpyeong-gun Sewer 
Maintenance 337  17  
Chungju-si Chungju-si Sewer Maintenance 1,748  87  
Cheongju-si Cheongju-si Sewer Maintenance 518  26  
Headquarters Relocation of Chungju-si Medical 
Center 1,153  58  
Chungcheongnam-do 
(19) 
Gyeryong-si (2) Gyeryong Culture Multiplex 417  21  
Gyeryong-si Sewer Maintenance 700  35  
Cheonan-si (6) Cheonan-si Sewer Maintenance 
(Stage 1) 2,198  110  
Cheonan-si Sewer Maintenance 
(Stage 2) 942  47  
Establishment of North Cheonan 
Library 253  13  
Cheonan Life Sports Park 231  12  
Cheonan Hong Dae Yong Science 
Museum 336  17   
Cheonan Culture & Art Multiplex 1,145  57  
Dangjin-si (2) Dangjin-si Sewer Maintenance 781  39  
Establishment of Dangjin 
Education, Culture & Sports Center 350  18  
Asan-si (3) Asan Indoor Life Sports Center 422  21  
Asan Sewer Maintenance 1,583  79  
Asan Jang Young Sil Science 
Museum 243  12  
Geumsan-gun Geumsan-gun Sewer Maintenance 653  33  
Nonsan-si Nonsan-si Sewer Maintenance 641  32  
Boryeong-si Boryeong-si Sewer Maintenance 718  36  
Seosan-si Seosan-si Sewer Maintenance 1,366  68  
Seocheon-gun Seocheon-gun Sewer Maintenance 598  30  
Hongseong-gun Hongseong-gun Sewer 
Maintenance 1,361  68  
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TABLE A1—FACILITY LEASE STATUS BY PROJECT TYPE (PRESENT VALUE) (Continued) 
Competent authority (Lower level) Name of project Total 
facility 
lease 
(present 
value) 
Annual 
facility 
lease 
(present 
value) 
Jeollabuk-do (11) Iksan-si (4) Establishment of Iksan Culture 
Multiplex 647  32  
Iksan City Mohyun Library 219  11  
Iksan-si Sewer Maintenance 2006 1,279  64  
Iksan-si Sewer Maintenance 2009 1,568  78  
Gimje-si (2) Gimje-si Sewer Maintenance 
2009 1,223  61  
Gimje-si Sewer Maintenance 592  30  
Gunsan-si  Gunsan-si Sewer Maintenance 1,433  72  
Wanju-gun Wanju-gun Sewer Maintenance 910  45  
Jeonju-si Jeonju-si Sewer Maintenance 1,987  99  
Jeongeup-si Jeongeup-si Sewer Maintenance 1,050  53  
Jinan-gun Jinan-gun Sewer  499  25  
Jeollanam-do (14) Gangjin-gun (2) Establishment of Gangjin Culture 
& Welfare Town  753  38  
Gangjin-gun Sewer 604  30   
Wando-gun Wando Customized Culture 
Multiplex 305  15  
Headquarters Relocation of Gangjin Hospital 602  30  
Hampyeong-gun Hampyeong-gun Public Geriatric 
Medical Care Hospital 103  5   
Hwasun-gun Hwasun Geriatric Hospital 290  15  
Mokpo-si (3) Mokpo-si Sewer Maintenance 
2005 1,101  55  
Mokpo-si Sewer Maintenance 
2006 1,302  65  
Mokpo-si Sewer Maintenance 
2009 643  32  
Yeosu-si (2) Yeosu-si Sewer Maintenance 
2008 926  46  
Yeosu-si Sewer Maintenance 
2005 768  38  
Naju-si Naju-si Sewer Maintenance 1,207  60  
Damyang-gun Damyang-gun Sewer 
Maintenance 480  24  
Jangheung-gun Jangheung-gun Sewer 
Maintenance 681  34  
Gyeongsangbuk-do 
(20) 
Gyeongju-si (3) Establishment of Gyeongju 
Culture & Art Center 1,338  67  
Gyeongju-si Sewer Maintenance 
2005 1,785  89  
Gyeongju-si Sewer Maintenance 
2008 1,424  71  
Andong-si Andong Culture & Art enter 951  48  
Uiseong-gun Uiseong-gun Public Hospital for 
Dementia  207  10  
Sangju-si (2) Sangju-si Sewer Maintenance 2005 1,405  70  
Sangju-si Sewer Maintenance 2006 932  47  
Pohang-si (3) Pohang-si Sewer Maintenance 2007 2,862  143  
Pohang-si Sewer Maintenance 2009 1,537  77  
Pohang-si Sewer Maintenance 2010 1,730  86  
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TABLE A1—FACILITY LEASE STATUS BY PROJECT TYPE (PRESENT VALUE) (Continued) 
Competent authority (Lower level) Name of project Total 
facility 
lease 
(present 
value) 
Annual 
facility 
lease 
(present 
value) 
Gyeongsangbuk-do 
(20) 
Goryeong-gun Goryeong-gun Sewer Maintenance 530  27  
Gimcheon-si (2) Gimcheon-si Sewer Maintenance  1,347  67  
Gimcheon Green Future Science 
Museum  568  28  
Mungyeong-si Mungyeong-si Sewer Maintenance  1,749  87  
Yeongdeok-gun Yeongdeok-gun Sewer 
Maintenance  708  35  
Yeongju-si (2) Yeongju-si Sewer Maintenance 
2010 744  37   
Yeongju-si Sewer Maintenance 1,425  71  
Yecheon-gun Yecheon-gun Sewer Maintenance  820  41   
Uljin-gun Uljin-gun Sewer Maintenance  1,200  60  
Chilgok-gun Chilgok-gun Sewer Maintenance  1,603  80  
Gyeongsangnam-
do (13) 
Uiryeong-gun Uiryeong Geriatric Hospital 74  4  
Gimhae-si (3) Gimhae-si Sewer Maintenance 2005 1,599  80  
Gimhae-si Sewer Maintenance 2006 1,470  74  
Gimhae-si Sewer Maintenance 2008 1,052  53  
Yangsan-si (2) Yangsan-si Sewer Maintenance 2006 958  48  
Yangsan-si Sewer Maintenance 2008 660  33  
Jinju-si (2) Jinju-si Sewer Maintenance 2006 1,333  67  
Jinju-si Sewer Maintenance 2008 1,758  88  
Geochang-gun Geochang-gun Sewer  587  29  
Changwon-si (2) Changwon-si Masan Sewer 
Maintenance  2,207  110   
Changwon Science Experience 
EXPO 534  27  
Sacheon-si Sacheon High-Tech Aviation Space 
Science Museum 227  11  
Tongyeong-si Tongyeong Sewer Maintenance 1,696  85  
Jeju Special Self-Governing Province (10) Establishment of Jeju Culture 
Multiplex 270  13  
Jeju Special Self-Governing 
Province Art Museum 288  14  
Seogwipo Hospital 744  37  
Seogwipo-si Country & Town 
Sewer Maintenance 2006 1,719  86  
Jeju-si Country & Town Sewer 
Maintenance 2006 1,135  57  
Jeju-si (East) Sewer Maintenance 
2006 1,045  52  
Jeju-si (East) Sewer Maintenance 
2008 1,201  60  
Jeju-si Country & Town Sewer 
Maintenance 2008 1,776  89  
Jeju-si Country & Town Sewer 
Maintenance 2009 893  45  
Jeju-si Country & Town Sewer 
Maintenance 2010 771  39  
Total 132,139 6,634 
Note: 1) “(  )” Indicates the number of projects. 2) Total facility rental fee is the national treasury and local funds 
combined by contract at the present value.   
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TABLE A2—ESTIMATED BALANCE OF BTL LEASES BY LOCAL AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES 
(UNIT: 1 MILLION KRW)  
Headquarters Total Amount of Lease Lease payments expected from 2014 
Seoul Gangnam 98,974 53,701 
Busan 
Haeundae 23,782 19,139 
Buk/Saha 21,621 12,181 
Main Office 230,940 155,895 
Daegu 98,576 50,202 
Incheon Bupyung 66,983 51,860 Main Office 184,779 124,636 
Gwangju 391,102 264,179 
Daejeon 383,886 250,315 
Ulsan 468,527 221,802 
Gyeonggi Paju 316,618 95,120 
 Yongin 261,002 72,458 
 Gimpo 162,652 48,795 
 Ansung 121,867 36,253 
 Ansan 27,788 20,647 
 Pyungtaek 285,446 90,695 
Gangwon Gangneung 130,538 28,142 
 Wonju 210,423 57,207 
 Chunchun 190,153 57,048 
 Hongchun 62,054 15,825 
Chungbuk Jecheon 284,123 88,019 
 Jincheon 89,684 21,564 
 Goisan 68,222 18,217 
 Boeun 35,309 7,207 
 Ogchen 40,208 9,999 
 Umsung 85,642 21,517 
 Jeungpyung 33,655 7,994 
 Chungju 174,766 46,966 
 Cheongju 51,837 23,762 
 Main Office 115,340 52,623 
Chungnam Gyeryong 111,732 48,703 
 Cheonan 510,570 221,256 
 Dangjin 113,194 35,368 
 Asan 224,801 75,947 
 Geumsan 65,340 16,906 
 Nonsan 64,147 15,153 
 Boryung 71,789 21,219 
 Seosan 136,587 38,754 
 Seocheon 59,759 15,911 
Main Office 975 17,807 
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TABLE A2—ESTIMATED BALANCE OF BTL LEASES BY LOCAL AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES (Continued) 
(UNIT: 1 MILLION KRW)  
Headquarters Total Amount of Lease Lease payments expected from 2014 
Jeonbuk Iksan 371,259 141,743 
 Gimje 181,507 54,450 
 Gunsan 143,285 37,611 
 Wanju 90,987 23,199 
 Jeonju 198,710 81,135 
 Jeongup 105,020 22,071 
 Jinan 49,928 11,897 
Jeonnam Gangjin 60,181 28,084 
 Wando 135,660 60,015 
 Main Office 30,456 14,991 
 Hampyung 10,274 4,880 
 Hwasun 28,995 14,532 
 Mokpo 304,662 81,060 
 Yeosu 169,376 46,398 
 Naju 120,679 34,393 
 Damyang 48,032 9,127 
 Janheung 68,104 17,535 
Gyeongbuk Gyeongju 454,659 196,817 
 Andong 95,112 48,889 
 Uisong 20,711 10,101 
 Sanju 233,648 56,715 
 Pohang 612,819 183,840 
 Goryung 53,040 9,869 
 Gimcheon 191,498 63,590 
 Mungyung 174,914 47,767 
 Youngduk 70,783 16,810 
 Youngju 216,877 65,064 
 Yecheon 82,025 24,607 
 Uljin 120,009 32,700 
 Chilgok 160,268 44,472 
Gyeongnam Uiryung 7,409 3,222 
 Gimhae 412,131 112,800 
 Yangsan 161,776 38,968 
 Jinju 309,096 88,731 
 Geochang 58,708 11,873 
 Changwon 274,123 79,021 
 Sacheon 22,743 10,801 
 Tongyung 169,644 49,407 
Jeju 984,048 340,932 
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TABLE A3—CHANGE IN DEBT RATIO WHEN INCLUDING THE BTL LEASE BALANCE  
(UNIT: 100 MIL. KRW, %) 
Category Low-level local 
government 
Debt 
(A) 
Budget 
(Grand 
total 
including 
fund)  
(B) 
Debt-
to-
budget 
ratio 
(A/B) 
(%) 
Rent 
balance 
of BTL 
project 
(Present 
value) 
Debt 
includin
g 
BTL 
lease 
balance 
(A’) 
Debt-to-
budget 
ratio 
(A’/B) 
Seoul Gangnam-gu 0 8,333 0/00 398 398 4.77% 
Busan Headquarters 28,670 103,085 27.80 1,140 29.810 28.92% 
Buk-gu 1 3,116 0.00 93 94 3.01% 
Haeundae 25 4,123 0.60 146 171 4.14% 
Daegu Headquarters 19,379 68,877 28.10 382 19,761 28.69% 
Incheon Headquarters 31,981 88,593 36.10 910 32,891 37.13% 
Bupyeong-gu 384 5,169 7.40 396 780 15.09% 
Gwangju Headquarters 7,987 39,787 20.10 1,918 9,905 24.89% 
Daejeon Headquarters 6,687 40,003 16.70 1,834 8,521 21.30% 
Ulsan Headquarters 5,215 30,461 17.10 1,647 6,862 22.53% 
Gyeonggi Yongin-si 5,211 17,993 29.00 535 5,746 31.93% 
Ansan-si 187 21,092 0.90 181 368 1.75% 
Pyeongtaek-si 719 11,956 6.00 656 1,375 11.50% 
Paju-si 833 9,185 9.10 701 1,534 16.70% 
Gimpo-si 981 7,941 12.40 351 1,332 16.77% 
Anseong-si 122 6,600 1.80 261 383 5.80% 
Gangwon Chuncheon-si 910 10,812 8.40 410 1,320 12.21% 
Wonju-si 1,563 9,810 15.90 419 1,982 20.20% 
Gangneung-si 736 7,449 9.90 213 949 12.74% 
Hongcheon-gun 0 5,265 0.00 119 119 2.26% 
Chungbuk 
 
Headquarters 6,105 38,384 15.90 388 6,493 16.92% 
Cheongju-si 1,482 12,847 11.50 181 1,663 12.94% 
Chungju-si 303 8,715 3.50 348 651 7.47% 
Jecheon-si 0 5,753 0.00 646 646 11.23% 
Boeun-gun 165 3,116 5.30 55 220 7.05% 
Okcheon-gun 157 3,921 4.00 76 233 5.93% 
Jeungpyeong-gun 85 1,878 4.50 61 146 7.78% 
Jincheon-gun 170 3,460 4.90 164 334 9.66% 
Goesan-gun 0 3,711 0.00 134 134 3.61% 
Eumseong-gun 65 4,798 1.40 164 229 4.78% 
Chungnam Cheonan-si 2,033 13,534 15.00 1,634 3,667 27.01% 
Boryeong-si 857 6,067 14.10 157 1,014 16.72% 
Asan-si 777 9,413 8.30 570 1,347 14.31% 
Seosan-si 429 6,737 6.40 283 712 10.57% 
Nonsan-si 433 5,745 7.50 116 549 9.56% 
Gyeryong-si 199 1,746 11.40 358 557 31.88% 
Dangjin-si 358 7,023 5.10 269 627 8.92% 
Geumsan-gun 129 3,611 3.60 127 256 7.08% 
Seocheon-gun 138 4,016 3.40 118 256 6.38% 
Hongseong-gun 309 4,611 6.70 292 601 13.03% 
Jeonbuk 
 
Jeonju-si 1,917 14,335 13.40 616 2,533 17.67% 
Gunsan-si 489 9,627 5.10 280 769 7.99% 
Iksan-si 1,780 10,324 17.20 1,032 2,812 27.24% 
Jeongeup-si 594 6,749 8.80 168 762 11.29% 
Gimje-si 219 6,359 3.40 371 590 9.27% 
Wanju-gun 827 5,443 15.20 174 1,001 18.40% 
Jinan-gun 18 3,326 0.50 88 106 3.18% 
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TABLE A3—CHANGE IN DEBT RATIO WHEN INCLUDING THE BTL LEASE BALANCE (Continued) 
(UNIT: 100 MIL. KRW, %) 
Category Low-level local 
government 
Debt 
(A) 
Budget 
(Grand 
total 
including 
fund) 
(B) 
Debt-to-
budget 
ratio 
(A/B) 
(%) 
Rent 
balance of 
BTL 
project 
(Present 
value) 
Debt 
including 
BTL lease 
balance 
(A’) 
Debt-to-
budget 
ratio 
(A’/B) 
Jeonnam 
 
Headquarters 10,683 69,987 15.30 206 10,889 15.56% 
Mokpo-si 953 6,717 14.20 602 1,555 23.14% 
Yeoju-si 916 9,923 9.20 341 1,257 12.67% 
Naju-si 344 6,041 5.70 251 595 9.85% 
Damyang-gun 78 3,446 2.30 70 148 4.29% 
Hwasun-gun 261 4,900 5.30 108 369 7.54% 
Jangheung-gun 80 3,523 2.30 131 211 6.00% 
Gangjin-gun 55 3,140 1.80 451 506 16.12% 
Hampyeong-gun 60 3,309 1.80 36 96 2.89% 
Wando-gun 0 4,223 0.00 114 114 2.69% 
Gyeongbuk Pohang-si 1,414 13,678 10.30 1,321 2,735 19.99% 
Gyeongju-si 593 12,008 4.90 1,475 2,068 17.22% 
Gimcheon-si 0 6,791 0.00 467 467 6.87% 
Andong-si 130 8,951 1.50 370 500 5.58% 
Yeongju-si 395 5,820 6.80 467 862 14.82% 
Sangju-si 423 6,771 6.20 428 851 12.57% 
Mungyeong-si 454 4,943 9.20 349 803 16.25% 
Uiseong-gun 0 4,879 0.00 73 73 1.50% 
Yeongdeok-gun 199 3,318 6.00 129 328 9.87% 
Goryeong-gun 33 2,889 1.10 74 107 3.71% 
Chilgok-gun 446 4,614 9.70 327 773 16.75% 
Yecheon-gun 210 3,552 5.90 177 387 10.89% 
Uljin-gun 159 5,575 2.90 241 400 7.18% 
Gyeongnam 
 
Changwon-si 2,013 27,307 7.40 593 2,606 9.54% 
Jinju-si 1,215 11,584 10.50 645 1,860 16.06% 
Tongyeong-si 398 5,083 7.80 358 756 14.87% 
Sacheon-si 232 4,813 4.80 79 311 6.46% 
Gimhae-si 1,419 11,645 12.20 839 2,258 19.39% 
Yangsan-si 1,122 7,926 14.20 290 1,412 17.81% 
Uiryeong-gun 96 3,651 2.60 24 120 3.29% 
Geochang-gun 8 5,014 0.20 88 96 1.92% 
Jeju Headquarters 6,927 42,914 16.10 2,504 9,431 21.98% 
Note: 1) 3.38%, the average yield of Korean Treasury bonds (five-year maturity) over the past three years, is 
applied as the discount rate of the present value. 2) Although Buk-gu and Saha-gu, Busan, are multiple competent 
authorities in charge of the Hwamyeong Library and Dadae Library projects, the comparison is made under Buk-
gu, as it is difficult to identify each local government’s share due to limited resources. 3) Local governments that 
have a debt-to-budget ratio exceeding 20% are in bold. 
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TABLE A4—ESTIMATED OPERATION COST BALANCE OF  
BTL PROJECTS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Competent authority  
(Lower level) 
Estimation  
of average 
annual 
operation 
cost by local 
government 
Estimation  
of remaining 
operation cost 
as of year-end 
2013 
Competent authority  
(Lower level) 
Estimation  
of average 
annual 
operation 
cost by local 
government 
Estimation 
of 
remaining 
operation 
cost as of 
year-end 
2013 
Seoul 
Metro-
politan 
City 
Gangnam-gu (2) 15 264 
Jeolla 
buk-do 
(11) Iksan-si (4) 44 837 
Busan 
Metro-
politan 
City (6) 
Haeundae 7 117 Gimje-si (2) 17 316 
Buk-gu/ 
Saha-gu 11 169 
Gunsan-si  16 280 
Headquarters (4) 37 513 Wanju-gun 9 151 
Daegu Metropolitan City 12 194 Jeonju-si 8 133 
Incheon 
Metro-
politan 
City (3) 
Bupyeong-gu 0.018  3  Jeongeup-si 6 98 
Headquarters 40   736  Jinan-gun 5 87 
Gwangju  
Metropolitan City (2) 36   699  
Jeolla 
nam-do 
(14) 
Gangjin-gun (2) 7 124 
Daejeon  
Metropolitan City (2) 58   1,101  
Wando-gun 19 332 
Ulsan Metropolitan City (3) 54   969 Headquarters 9 144 
Gyeonggi-
do (10) 
Paju-si (3) 39   704 Hampyeong-gun 2 43 
Yongin-si (3) 58   1,060  Hwasun-gun 5 88 
Gimpo-si 17  333  Mokpo-si (3) 15 272 
Anseong-si 8  167  Yeosu-si (2) 13 243 
Ansan-si (2) 13   91  Naju-si 10 194 
Pyeongtaek-si 18  354  Damyang-gun 5  79 
Gangwon-
do (4) 
Gangneung-si 13  219  Jangheung-gun 3 48 
Wonju-si 15  278  Gyeong 
sang 
buk-do 
(20) 
Gyeongju-si (3) 52 896 
Chuncheon-si 14  280  Andong-si 19 309 
Hongcheon-gun 9  147  Uiseong-gun 5 91 Sangju-si (2) 18 299 
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TABLE A4—ESTIMATED OPERATION COST BALANCE OF  
BTL PROJECTS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Continued) 
Competent authority 
(Lower level) 
Estimation  
of average 
annual 
operation cost 
by local 
government 
Estimation of 
the remaining 
operation cost 
as of year-end 
2013 
Competent authority  
(Lower level) 
Estimation 
of the 
average 
annual 
operation 
cost by local 
governments
Estimation of 
the remaining 
year-end 
operation cost 
as of 2013 
Chung 
cheong 
buk-do 
(14) 
Jecheon-si 
(4) 45  797 
Chung 
cheong 
nam-do 
(19) 
Pohang-si (3) 31 610 
Jincheon-gun (2) 8 129 Goryeong-gun 8 135 
Goesan-gun 7 122 Gimcheon-si (2) 23 422 
Boeun-gun 5 79  Mungyeong-si 16 293 
Okcheon-gun 6 100  Yeongdeok-gun 5 85 
Eumseong-gun 9 154  Yeongju-si (2) 19 387 
Jeungpyeong-
gun 3 50  Yecheon-gun 7 143 
Chungju-si 23 419 Uljin-gun 10 190 
Cheongju-si 3 52 Chilgok-gun 13 236 
Headquarters 10 178 Uiryeong-gun 3 51 
Chung 
cheong 
nam-do 
(19) 
Gyeryong-si (2) 15 262  Gimhae-si (3) 26 474 
Cheonan-si (6) 77 1,393 Yangsan-si (2) 17 296 
Dangjin-si (2) 25 403 Jinju-si (2) 26 495 
Asan-si (3) 37 648 Geochang-gun 5 94 
Geumsan-gun 8 140 Changwon-si (2) 18 300 
Nonsan-si 3 52 Sacheon-si 7 137 
Boryeong-si 8 141 Tongyeong-si 14 272 
Seosan-si 15 292 Jeju Special Self-Governing 
Province (10) 100 1,824 Seocheon-gun 6 108 Hongseong-gun 14 282 
Note: 1) “(  )” indicates the number of projects. 2) All operation costs are paid by local governments. 
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TABLE A5—ESTIMATION TOTAL OF  
FUTURE PAYMENT AMOUNTS (PRESENT VALUES) REGARDING  
PPP PROJECTS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS  
(UNIT: 100 MIL. KRW) 
Competent authority 
(Lower level) 
Estimation of 
BTL lease 
balance by 
local 
governments 
Estimation of 
BTL operation 
cost balance by 
local 
governments 
Estimation of 
MRG balance 
by local 
governments 
Estimation of 
fixed charges 
balance by 
local 
governments 
Total 
Seoul 
Metropolitan 
City 
Headquarters   1,425   1,425 
Gangnam-gu 537 264   801 
Busan 
Metropolitan 
City  
Headquarters 1,559 513  1,012 1,531 4,615 
Haeundae-gu 191 117    308 
Buk-gu/Saha-gu 122 169    291 
Daegu Metropolitan City  502 194   696 
Incheon 
Metropolitan 
City  
Headquarters 1,246 736  667  844 3,494 
Bupyeong-gu 519 3   521 
Gwangju Metropolitan City  2,642 699 7,237  10,578 
Daejeon Metropolitan City 2,503 1101   3,604 
Ulsan Metropolitan City  2,218 969   3,187 
Gyeonggi-do Headquarters   3,535   3,535 
Paju-si  951 704   1,655 
Yongin-si  725 1060   1,784 
Gimpo-si 488 333   821 
Anseong-si 363 167   530 
Ansan-si  206 91   297 
Pyeongtaek-si 907 354  873 2,134 
Gunpo-Si   106   106 
Yeoju-si   5  5 
Hwaseong-si    733 733 
Gangwon-do Headquarters   1,033  1,033 
Gangneung-si 281 219   501 
Wonju-si 572 278   850 
Chuncheon-si 570 280   851 
Hongcheon-gun 158 147   306 
Chungcheong 
buk-do 
Headquarters 526 178   704 
Jecheon-si 880 797   1,677 
Jincheon-gun  216 129   345 
Goesan-gun 182 122   304 
Boeun-gun 72 79   151 
Okcheon-gun 100 100   200 
Eumseong-gun 215 154   369 
Jeungpyeong-
gun 80 50   130 
Chungju-si 470 419   888 
Cheongju-si 238 52   290 
Chungcheong 
nam-do 
Gyeryong-si 487 261   749 
Cheonan-si  2,213 1393   3,606 
Dangjin-si  354 403   757 
Asan-si  759 648   1,407 
Geumsan-gun 169 140   309 
Nonsan-si 152 52   204 
Boryeong-si 212 141 81  434 
Seosan-si 388 292   680 
Seocheon-gun 159 108   268 
Hongseong-gun 405 282   687 
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TABLE A5—ESTIMATION TOTAL OF  
FUTURE PAYMENT AMOUNTS (PRESENT VALUES) REGARDING  
PPP PROJECTS BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Continued) 
(UNIT: 100 MIL. KRW) 
Competent authority (Lower level) Estimation of 
BTL lease 
balance by 
local 
governments 
Estimation of 
BTL operation 
cost balance 
by local 
governments 
Estimation of 
MRG balance 
by local 
governments 
Estimation of 
fixed charges 
balance by 
local 
governments 
Total 
Jeollabuk-do  Headquarters    2,795 2,795 
Iksan-si  1,417 837   2,254 
Gimje-si 545 316   861 
Gunsan-si  376 280   656 
Wanju-gun 232 151   383 
Jeonju-si 811 133   944 
Jeongeup-si 221 98   318 
Jinan-gun 119 87   206 
Jeollanam-do Headquarters 281 124   405 
Gangjin-gun 600 332   932 
Wando-gun 150 144   294 
Hampyeong-gun 49 43   92 
Hwasun-gun 145 88   233 
Mokpo-si 811 272   1,082 
Bosung-gun    137 137 
Yeosu-si 464 243   707 
Naju-si 344 194   538 
Damyang-gun 91 79   170 
Jangheung-gun 175 48   223 
Goheung-gun   4  4 
Gyeongsang 
buk-do 
Gyeongju-si 1,968 896   2,865 
Andong-si 489 309   797 
Uiseong-gun 101 91   192 
Sangju-si 567 299   866 
Pohang-si 1,838 610  542 2,991 
Goryeong-gun 99 135   233 
Gimcheon-si 636 422   1,058 
Mungyeong-si 478 293 52  823 
Yeongdeok-gun 168 85   253 
Yeongju-si 651 387   1,038 
Yecheon-gun 246 143   389 
Uljin-gun 327 190   517 
Chilgok-gun 445 236  575 1,255 
Gyeongsang 
nam-do 
Headquarters   6,688  6,688 
Uiryeong-gun 32 51   83 
Gimhae-si 1,128 474   1,602 
Yangsan-si 390 296   686 
Jinju-si 887 495   1,382 
Geochang-gun 119 94   213 
Changwon-si 790 300   1,090 
Sacheon-si 108 137   245 
Tongyeong-si 494 272   766 
Jeju Special Self-Governing 
Province 3,409 1,824   5,233 
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TABLE A6—RATIO BETWEEN ANNUAL EXPENDITURE AND  
BUDGET BY LOW-LEVEL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
Local government (Basics) Ratio to budget 
Annual Gov’t Payment/Budget ratio 
Seoul Main Office 0.03% Gangnam 0.54% 
Busan 
Main Office 0.37% 
Haeundae 0.46% 
Buk/Saha 0.58% 
Daegu 0.06% 
Incheon Main Office 0.26% Bupyung 0.63% 
Gwangju 1.54% 
Daejeon 0.48% 
Ulsan 0.59% 
Gyounggi 
Main Office 0.08% 
Paju 1.00% 
Yongin 0.55% 
Gimpo 0.52% 
Ansung 0.40% 
Ansan 0.21% 
Pyungtaek 1.02% 
Gunop 0.13% 
Yeoju 0.01% 
Hwasung 0.34% 
Gangwon 
Main Office 0.09% 
Gangneung 0.41% 
Wongju 0.46% 
Chunchun 0.39% 
Hongchun 0.34% 
Chungbuk 
Main Office 0.10% 
Jecheon 1.61% 
Jincheon 0.62% 
Goisan 0.44% 
Boeun 0.30% 
Okcheon 0.31% 
Umsung 0.46% 
Jengpyung 0.44% 
Chungju 0.57% 
Cheongju 0.14% 
Chungnam 
Gyeryong 2.50% 
Chenan 1.47% 
Dangjin 0.67% 
Asan 0.87% 
Geumsan 0.50% 
Nonsan 0.22% 
Boryung 0.44% 
Seosan 0.53% 
Seocheon 0.38% 
Hongsung 0.75% 
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TABLE A6—RATIO BETWEEN ANNUAL EXPENDITURE AND  
BUDGET BY LOW-LEVEL LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Continued) 
Local government (Basics) Ratio to budget 
Annual Gov’t Payment/Budget ratio 
Jeonbuk 
Main Office 0.29% 
Iksan 1.15% 
Gimje 0.69% 
Gunsan 0.39% 
Wanju 0.41% 
Jeonju 0.40% 
Jeungup 0.29% 
Jinan 0.34% 
Jeonnam 
  
Main Office 0.03% 
Gangjin 1.75% 
Wando 0.42% 
Hampyung 0.15% 
Hwasun 0.27% 
Mokpo 0.90% 
Bosung 0.39% 
Yeosu 0.39% 
Naju 0.47% 
Damyang 0.31% 
Jangheung 0.37% 
Goheung 0.01% 
Gyeongbuk 
Gyeongju 1.39% 
Andong 0.54% 
Uisung 0.20% 
Sangju 0.77% 
Pohang 1.29% 
Goryung 0.48% 
Gimcheon 0.84% 
Mungyeong 0.92% 
Youngduk 0.48% 
Youngju 0.74% 
Yecheon 0.55% 
Uljin 0.51% 
Chilgok 1.64% 
Gyeongnam 
Main Office 0.35% 
Uiryung 0.13% 
Gimhae 0.78% 
Yangsan 0.49% 
Jinju 0.63% 
Geochang 0.24% 
Changwon 0.24% 
Sacheon 0.27% 
Tongyoung 0.78% 
Jeju Special Self-Governing Province 0.66%   
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TABLE A7—TOTAL ANNUAL EXPENDITURE ON PPP PROJECTS COMPARED TO  
THE BUDGET BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
(UNIT: 100 MIL. KRW) 
Competent authority 
(Lower level) 
Budget 
(Grand total 
including 
funds) 
Annual 
BTL lease 
Fixed 
charges in 
2013 
Annual 
BTL 
operation 
cost 
Average 
annual 
MRG 
payments 
Total Ratio to 
budget  
(%) 
Seoul 
Metropolitan 
City 
Headquarters 260,345    68 68  0.03% 
Gangnam-gu 8,333 31  15   45  0.54% 
Busan 
Metropolitan 
City  
Headquarters 103,085 96 183 37  67 383  0.37% 
Haeundae-gu 4,123 12  7   19  0.46% 
Buk-gu 3,116 8  10   18  0.58% 
Daegu Metropolitan City 68,877 31  12   43  0.06% 
Incheon 
Metropolitan 
City  
Headquarters 88,593 66 48 40  74 229  0.26% 
Bupyeong-gu 5,169 33  0.18   33  0.63% 
Gwangju Metropolitan City 39,787 137  36  439 612  1.54% 
Daejeon Metropolitan City 40,003 134  58   193  0.48% 
Ulsan Metropolitan City 30,461 125  54   180  0.59% 
Gyeonggi-do  Headquarters 174,935    141 141  0.08% 
Paju-si 9,185 53  39   92  1.00% 
Yongin-si 17,993 40  58   98  0.55% 
Gimpo-si 7,941 24  17   41  0.52% 
Anseong-si 6,600 18  8   27  0.40% 
Ansan-si 21,092 30  13   43  0.21% 
Pyeongtaek-si 11,956 46 58 18   122  1.02% 
Gunpo-Si 4,963    7 7  0.13% 
Yeoju-si 3,731    1 1  0.01% 
Hwaseong-si 14,150  49   49  0.34% 
Gangwon-do  Headquarters 48,461    45 45  0.09% 
Gangneung-si 7,449 17  13   30  0.41% 
Wonju-si 9,810 31  15   45  0.46% 
Chuncheon-si 10,812 29  14   43  0.39% 
Hongcheon-gun 5,265 9  9   18  0.34% 
Chungcheong 
buk-do  
Headquarters 38,384 29  10   39  0.10% 
Jecheon-si 5,753 48  45   92  1.61% 
Jincheon-gun 3,460 13  8   21  0.62% 
Goesan-gun 3,711 10  7   16  0.44% 
Boeun-gun 3,116 4  5   9  0.30% 
Okcheon-gun 3,921 6  6   12  0.31% 
Eumseong-gun 4,798 13  9   22  0.46% 
Jeungpyeong-
gun 1,878 5  3   8  0.44% 
Chungju-si 8,715 26  23   50  0.57% 
Cheongju-si 12,847 15  3   18  0.14% 
Chungcheong 
nam-do 
Gyeryong-si 1,746 28  15   44  2.50% 
Cheonan-si 13,534 122  77   199  1.47% 
Dangjin-si 7,023 22  25   47  0.67% 
Asan-si 9,413 45  37   82  0.87% 
Geumsan-gun 3,611 10  8   18  0.50% 
Nonsan-si 5,745 10  3   13  0.22% 
Boryeong-si 6,067 12  8  7 26  0.44% 
Seosan-si 6,737 20  15   36  0.53% 
Seocheon-gun 4,016 9  6   15  0.38% 
Hongseong-gun 4,611 20  14   35  0.75% 
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TABLE A7—TOTAL ANNUAL EXPENDITURE ON PPP PROJECTS COMPARED TO  
THE BUDGET BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (Continued) 
(UNIT: 100 MIL. KRW) 
Competent authority 
(Lower level) 
Budget 
(Grand total 
including 
funds) 
Annual 
BTL lease 
Fixed 
charges in 
2013 
Annual 
BTL 
operation 
cost 
Average 
annual 
MRG 
payments 
Total Ratio to 
budget  
(%) 
Jeollabuk-do Headquarters 53,235 0 155   155  0.29% 
Iksan-si 10,324 74  44   119  1.15% 
Gimje-si 6,359 27  17   44  0.69% 
Gunsan-si 9,627 21  44   65  0.68% 
Wanju-gun 5,443 14  9   23  0.41% 
Jeonju-si 14,335 50  8   58  0.40% 
Jeongeup-si 6,749 14  6   20  0.29% 
Jinan-gun 3,326 6  5   11  0.34% 
Jeollanam-
do 
Headquarters 69,987 15  7   22  0.03% 
Gangjin-gun 3,140 35  19   55  1.75% 
Wando-gun 4,223 9  9   18  0.42% 
Hampyeong-gun 3,309 3  2   5  0.15% 
Hwasun-gun 4,900 8  5   13  0.27% 
Mokpo-si 6,717 46  15   61  0.90% 
Bosung-gun 3,942 0 15   15  0.39% 
Yeosu-si 9,923 25  13   38  0.39% 
Naju-si 6,041 18  10   28  0.47% 
Damyang-gun 3,446 6  5   11  0.31% 
Jangheung-gun 3,523 10  3   13  0.37% 
Goheung-gun 5,557    0.36 0  0.01% 
Gyeongsang 
buk-do 
Gyeongju-si 12,008 115  52   167  1.39% 
Andong-si 8,951 29  19   48  0.54% 
Uiseong-gun 4,879 5  5   10  0.20% 
Sangju-si 6,771 34  18   52  0.77% 
Pohang-si 13,678 92 54 31   176  1.29% 
Goryeong-gun 2,889 6  8   14  0.48% 
Gimcheon-si 6,791 34  23   57  0.84% 
Mungyeong-si 4,943 25  16  5 46  0.92% 
Yeongdeok-gun 3,318 11  5   16  0.48% 
Yeongju-si 5,820 23  19   43  0.74% 
Yecheon-gun 3,552 12  7   19  0.55% 
Uljin-gun 5,575 18  10   28  0.51% 
Chilgok-gun 4,614 24 39 13   76  1.64% 
Gyeongsang 
nam-do 
Headquarters 76,969    268 268  0.35% 
Uiryeong-gun 3,651 2  3   5  0.13% 
Gimhae-si 11,645 64  26   90  0.78% 
Yangsan-si 7,926 22  17   39  0.49% 
Jinju-si 11,584 46  26   72  0.63% 
Geochang-gun 5,014 7  5   12  0.24% 
Changwon-si 27,307 46  18   65  0.24% 
Sacheon-si 4,813 6  7   13  0.27% 
Tongyeong-si 5,083 25  14   39  0.78% 
Jeju Special Self-Governing 
Province 42,914 185  100   285  0.66% 
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